First of all, forget harmonizing the entire text. I'm talking about reconstructing the Gospels' events into historical sequence. Succinctly, here's how that can be reasonably done.
If we posit two Nazareth homecomings and two fishermen callings, the sequence of major events in Mark and Luke suddenly finds complete harmony, even if minor details continue to diverge. Matthew's sequence differs only between chapters 5 and 13. After John the Baptist's beheading, Matthew's narrative sequence shows no contradictions with Mark and Luke. If we also posit two Temple cleansings, the sequence in John's Gospel also blends perfectly with the rest. (**There are other ways around this little problem, but for time's sake, at the moment, we begin by simply assuming those three points.** Update: see my response to Tim's question in the comments.**) So stipulated, we begin.
The first event to harmonize is Jesus feeding the 5,000. This dates JTB's beheading to the middle Passover of John's Gospel. The first Passover of John's Gospel comes just before JTB's arrest. Jesus left Judea when he heard about that arrest, and that the Pharisees were now more concerned about Jesus than about John. This brings us to a critical point of consideration.
Herod Antipas probably captured the Baptist somewhere in the Transjordan region, which Antipas controlled. Why, then, did Jesus leave JUDEA when he heard about this arrest? The only possible danger for Jesus was if he suspected the Sanhedrin might begin to consider arresting him for extradition to Galilee. At this point, it seems, the Pharisees just wanted Jesus to go back to 'Hicksville'. Wisely, he obliged their desire before they could hatch any plans.
For all of John's imprisonment, Jesus stays in Galilee (except briefly, in Jn.5). After Herod Antipas notices Jesus, the Lord withdraws from Galilee repeatedly, slipping into every neighboring country at some point except in the direction of Judea. After some period of these 'withdrawals' had passed, Jesus made plans to go back south. What had changed? The Pharisees would still want to extradite Jesus back to Antipas, and now the Tetrarch was actually looking for him! Why was it suddenly safe?
Sejanus must have died. Antipas must have had some kind of agreement with Sejanus for the Tetrarch to divorce his Arabian wife, effectively ending the treaty with King Aretas and jeopardizing peace in the region while Tiberius entered his 70's. Herod Antipas would not have risked everything for Herodias, unless he really did have a deal with Sejanus. So the caution Antipas [and Pilate also] displayed at Jesus' trial really must have been because of the climate in Rome. Heads of Sejanus' old allies were still rolling with the slightest provocation.
The point at the moment is that Antipas' caution did not begin at Jesus' trial in early 33. Antipas' caution began at Sejanus' death in late 31. Therefore, if the period of Jesus' withdrawals reflects a time after John's death when Judea was still unsafe to enter, then John must have died before Passover of 31. That makes the second 'half' of Jesus' ministry two years long. The missing Passover of 32 is most likely locatable around the time of the Temple Tax (Matthew's coin in-the-fish episode).
Incidentally, Jesus' visit to Tabernacles and Hanukkah could arguably go in 32 because that was after Sejanus had died, but 31 is not impossible, because Tiberius spread rumors all year long in 31 that Sejanus' life could be in danger. If Antipas got wind of what was coming, the Father - yes, we're getting spiritual now - could have told Jesus it was safe. That is a valid spiritual-historical consideration, especially if we take the word "sent" in its most immediate sense (Jn. 8:16, 18, 26, 29, 42; in contrast, Jn.10:36, "sent into the world", reads very differently.) The dubious level of safety could partly explain why the disciples do not join Jesus on this trip. However, it remains less than perfectly clear at the moment whether John 7-10 could belong in 31 or 32. The earlier date fits better with the overall structure of events and even with the development of Jesus' public discourse, but it requires Jesus to have special confidence that he would remain safe. However, this does fall several months into his period of withdrawals, and on the balance of all considerations the timing does seem to work. Cautiously, then, we should prefer 31 for these two months in Judea.
The last major question is whether John's imprisonment lasted the better part of one year, or two. The sabbath grain plucking incident occurs well in the middle of John's imprisonment in all three Synoptic Gospels. The fact that grain was ripe points to another missing Passover. Therefore, the first Passover mentioned in John's Gospel belongs in 29 AD, and the sabbath grain plucking must have occurred in 30. (Incidentally, the "harvest" Jesus mentioned in Samaria must have been the fall harvest. His reference to "white fields" was merely a mixed metaphor - not so uncommon for him, really!)
We now see a total of five Passovers - 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33 AD. Jesus' ministry in-between those Passovers was four years long. John was in prison for most of the first two years, and Sejanus died in the third autumn. This completely aligns most of the historical landscape for Gospel events. The rest falls into place very quickly.
One other incidental issue, first, is to consider that the death of the Empress Livia in 29 (most likely late winter in early 29) could have called Herod Antipas out of the country to pay his respects in Rome (and most likely also to firm up his relations, whatever they were, with Sejanus, because Livia's death was the start of the Prefect's big power play, and that fact was apparently obvious to everyone but Tiberius at the time). In any event, if Antipas did leave for Rome in 29 it would explain perfectly why Jesus gained fame all over Palestine without Herod noticing, and why the Pharisees went "to the Herodians" in Mark 3:6 instead of "to Herod". (That Antipas was in Rome has been suggested before, but considered implausible because there was no cause for the trip in 30 AD, in Hoehner's chronology.)
Our final task here is to work backwards from the first Passover. We need to account for at least 40 days after the Lord's baptism, plus some recovery time after such an ordeal, plus even more. There had to be some travel time - another trip to and from Transjordan and then to Cana and Capernaum - all before the Passover of 29 AD.
Regarding John's ministry, Luke tells us that "all the people were baptized" before Jesus came to be baptized. Of course we assume Luke means all the ones who-were-going-to-be-baptized, and obviously not every solitary soul in the land, but his phrase still suggests that everyone in Israel had a chance to hear about John that year, and to go to him. Because the 15th year of Tiberius can plausibly refer to all of 28 AD (by more than one method of reckoning, and we must admit we have no way to know which method Luke 'should' have preferred), it seems likely that John preached and baptized through all three festival seasons of that year.
Altogether, this means Jesus most likely came to be baptized around the turn of October in 28 AD. His wilderness trial filled out the rest of 28, leaving three months for recovery, recruiting, moving his family to Capernaum, and final personal preparation before his first public Passover, at which he essentially declared himself the Messiah by cleansing the Temple.
That concludes the entire skeleton of what I contend must be the one, most likely, most plausible reconstruction of the Gospels' events, in chronological order and with full historical context.
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Event Synopsis/Timeline:
28 AD - In the fifteenth year of Tiberius' rule, John the Baptist begins his ministry in the wilderness. John baptizes all spring and summer, preparing the way for Jesus. In Autumn, Jesus comes to be baptized. He is 33 years old. (Luke says "about" 30.) Jesus spends the first half of winter alone, fasting and being temped in the wilderness.
29 AD - Jesus recovers from his testing at home in Nazareth. John begins baptizing again in early Spring. Jesus’ disciples begin to follow him. Passover: Jesus visits Jerusalem and clears the temple. Herod Antipas divorces his Nabatean wife (the daughter of King Aretes). John the Baptist is imprisoned by Herod for criticizing the divorce. Herod (possibly) sails for Rome after hearing of Livia's death. Jesus and his disciples flee Judea after John's arrest. Briefly, they visit Samaria on their way back to Galilee. Peter and Jesus' disciples go back to normal life after their trip, as anyone would. Jesus calls the fishermen the first time and invites Peter to go to other towns, but Peter stays in Bethsaida. Jesus travels alone the rest of the year, and rests for some time during winter.
30 AD - Spring: Jesus calls the fishermen the second time and they begin follow him. Jesus calls Matthew. The disciples pick grain on a sabbath. Jesus officially selects his twelve apostles, some weeks before Passover. They travel all over Galilee together, living on fishing profits and free heads of grain. Jesus' fame spreads far and wide. Soon, a few wealthy women begin to travel with the group, providing for their needs financially. Jesus stays in Galilee all year - he does not go down to Judea. Before autumn, Jesus takes his disciples along on his second Nazareth homecoming. As the fall harvest approaches, Jesus sends his disciples out in pairs to many cities. Herod Antipas (possibly) sails back from Rome by October. Again, Jesus appears to be less active during the winter. He is probably resting.
31 AD - Herod Antipas has John the Baptist beheaded sometime before Passover. Shortly after, Herod realizes the reports he's been catching up on are about Jesus, not old news about John. Herd begins trying to see Jesus. Jesus' disciples, having traveled through the winter, find Jesus in some town (Tiberias or Capernaum?) just before Passover. Jesus feeds the 5,000. The people in Judea hail John as a martyr, and condemn Herod for his death. In Autumn, Jesus finally visits Jerusalem again, and stays through December. In October, Sejanus is finally killed, in Rome. This news is confirmed in all Palestine some weeks later. Antipas and Pilate begin ruling with additional caution. Jesus remains safe in Judea for two months, from mid-October to mid-December. He does not seem to rest much this particular winter.
32 AD - Jesus travels up towards Syria, near Tyre and Sidon. On their journey, Jesus begins preparing his disciples for his death. Peter confesses that Jesus is the Messiah. Jesus is transfigured on a mountain with Moses and Elijah. Around Passover time, Peter obligates Jesus to paying the Temple-Tax. After Passover, Jesus leaves Galilee and begins a year-long tour around Judea. They visit at least 35 cities all over Judea. Jesus repeats teachings in Judea which he'd been giving in Galilee since two and three years ago. Jesus and his disciples find a second home in Bethany, with their friends Lazarus, Martha and Mary. Three things prevent the Jews from laying hands on Jesus all year long: He keeps avoiding Jerusalem, the people are still upset about John's martyrdom, and Herod Antipas refuses to allow extradition. Because of the current political climate, Antipas cannot risk causing more unrest in his kingdom/tetrarchy.
33 AD - Jesus has become so popular the Jews have no choice but to plot against him. At what is only the second Jerusalem Passover of his five Passovers in public activity, Jesus cleanses the Temple again. The Pharisees and Herodians try to trap him with a coin, but the Sadducees finally have to strong arm Pontius Pilate into using Rome's garrison to arrest Jesus. Jesus is tried, crucified, buried and ascends. Then he appears to the disciples and gives them the Holy Spirit... and THAT is only the beginning of the next chapter in Jesus' Story!
Bill Heroman, Amateur Academic
Showing posts with label Nabatea. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Nabatea. Show all posts
November 12, 2009
November 11, 2009
Pauline Chronology
As of now, this is merely a rough sketch of where the most important key points in Pauline Chronology happen to lie. Someday I'll start writing this all out more appropriately, with supporting research and more sequential arguments. Until then, feel free to have a go at researching and publishing on this arrangement yourself. Just be sure to mention my name. :-)
The three points that will chiefly distinguish this chronology are as follows:
As a package, these points comprise my original contribution to the field of Pauline Chronology, which is simply a new set of boundaries for all other considerations. Based on solid historical judgments, those boundaries happen to be very tight. This is fortunate. The overarching framework of arguments and possibilities, of course, we all owe to many, many scholars and researchers who have gone before. Therefore, beyond the above points, all other evidence should be well established and easily locatable in standard reference manuals.
Note: In the rough sketch that now follows, many points are referred to ahead of time, and again after the fact. To anyone who has studied these issues, the overall argument should (hopefully) come across best if you read straight through this post, without skipping around at first.
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Conversion - early 34 AD - No Roman Emperor ever "gave" Damascus to Nabatea but King Aretas sent the Ethnarch to get Paul at a time when Aretas was still active north of his own territory, which must have been before Tiberius died. It could not have been after. Among other reasons, we know this because the prefect Macro (successor to Sejanus) was essentially running the empire all year long in 37 AD, so Caligula was highly unlikely to reverse policy on Nabatea after Herod Antipas' letter. For more details, see here.
Antioch's relief commission - 44 AD - Because they could not have sent hundreds of ox carts with grain from the coast, especially in the middle of a famine, the church in Antioch must have sent Paul and Barnabas with money. That money was no good unless it came early enough that the church in Jerusalem could begin surreptitiously building a stockpile. (Even if they were going to give it away, the food bank had to built up in secret. Otherwise, what was the point?) Therefore, Paul and Barnabas did not wait until the famine itself (46/47 AD) and therefore Acts 11:30 and 12:25 cannot be extracted from Acts 12. If we leave Acts 12 just as it is written, then the relief visit happens in 44 AD and thus Galatians 2 cannot apply to an inclusive 14 year difference between Paul's conversion and this visit. Therefore, Galatians 2 most likely refers to the Council of Acts 15, despite those who still attempt to suppose an additional visit before the Council. For more on famine relief logistics, see here.
[***UPDATE (7/31/10): If Agrippa died in March of 44, as holds the consensus, then the relief delivery and that traumatic Passover in which Luke sets it, both, belong to 43 AD. Since Galatians 2 cannot refer to any year that's actually before the famine, anyway, this update is a moot point chronologically speaking, as far as affecting the rest of this timeline. Update 2: Red color added to text in paragraph above. For more, see this post. ***]
Galatians - 50 AD - Writen to the four South Galatian churches of Acts; before the Epistle of James, but after the council; it was carried by Titus & Luke, who visited all four churches and went on to wait for Paul at Troas (the one city everyone knew how to find, in West Asia Minor); that Titus' circumcision *was even an issue* and *could have been* "compelled" strongly suggests that this visit was part of the council occasion and virtually confirms that Galatians 2 refers to Acts 15. Further, the fact that Paul expects the Galatians to know who Titus is most likely means Titus himself was the letter carrier. As a witness to the events in Jerusalem, Titus was the perfect one to send, and he could easily have been holding Jerusalem's letter in reserve, as additional support for Paul's position. Thus, Paul had no need to mention the shorter letter because Titus was probably carrying it also - presumably on loan from missionally-minded Antioch. (For even more on Galatians and the Council, see here, here, here, and (again) here.)
1st & 2nd Thessalonians - 51 AD - standard view easily dated by Gallio's time in Corinth. We should note here, for later, that Timothy seems to have trouble sticking with his assignment, and keeps running to Paul for assistance. He's going to do this again, 6 years later, in Ephesus.
Departure from Corinth - 52 AD - Paul must have talked with Peter in Jerusalem, about Corinth, somewhere in the middle or the end of sailing season in 52. At least, that is necessary in order for Peter to have sailed to Corinth here in 53 and caused so much trouble (53/54) in unfortunate preparation for a summer of letters going back and forth between Corinth and Paul, in 54. (On which date, see note at top, and see below.) Incidentally, many of the controversies that arose in Corinth around the time of Peter's visit bear striking parallels to the letter of Jerusalem, which suggests Paul had not shown it to Corinth, but that Peter had. Controversies over tongues and healing are also, most likely, symptomatic of Peter's visit.
Epistle of James - c.52 or 51 AD - Paul's visit to Jerusalem in 52 also means James' letter had probably been written by 52, because there is no chance James and Paul did not see each other during this visit, and that makes this the first chance they had to sit down and iron out their perceived differences [over things they didn't really disagree about, except perhaps semantically]. Circumcision was not argued in James' Epistle, and we have no record that James ever heard Paul say the things written in Galatians, before Galatians was written. James must have been responding, in part, to things Paul wrote in his first letter. (Church Councils are not magic cure-alls. They just aren't.)
1st Corinthians - 54 AD, before October - This is an especially critical point for aligning the rest of Paul's dates, and it is based on the fact that Paul talks about travel plans but does not include Rome. The Jews weren't allowed back in until Claudius died, and Paul's trip to Illyricum (Western Provincia Macedonia) must have been planned as part of preparations for going to Rome. Ephesus is also when Paul began speaking of Rome, according to Acts. Further, this letter must be 54, and could not be 53 because Claudius' death also best explains what interrupts Paul's stated plans to sail after Pentecost (which generally assured safe sailing weather; by the way, Paul's also had all of his first three shipwrecks by now).
2nd Corinthians - 56 AD, around November - Aristarchus, Secundus and Sopater evidently knew how to get through the Greek hinterland (Acts 20:4a). This letter mentions Macedonians currently visiting Corinth and Paul sounds as if he is following them there shortly. This must be at the end of Paul's Macedonian trip, for two reasons. First, the trip to the Adriatic and back (Acts 20:1-2 & Romans 15:19) must have taken over a year, and second, Timothy must have intercepted Paul in Thessalonica on Paul's way back from Dyrrachium, before Paul headed to Corinth. Timothy, of course, had been struggling in Ephesus since Paul left him there to go into Macedonia, and must have spent the winter of 54/55 building up enough angst & frustration to make Timothy, desperately, flee Ephesus to go seek out Paul's help (just as Timothy had done at least twice before, in Thessalonica). All of this means 2nd Corinthians cannot have been written until after Paul's trip to Illyricum, probably only a month or two before Paul himself returned to Achaia. Timothy simply had to leave Ephesus in time to be in Macedonia with Paul, in time to co-sign this epistle. (See also discussion on 1st Timothy, below.)
Romans - 57 AD - the turnover from Felix to Festus in 59 (not 60) is made necessary here by one of our three key starting points (at top) - that Paul was most likely executed in connection with the great fire of Rome. Again, confirming this point removes the need for those often but ill-conceived (and certainly purely contrived) later itineraries of Paul, Timothy and Titus. In fact, scholarship through the ages has generally considered Paul's death in 64 to be the first and most likely option. The only real obstacle to this has been an over-rigidity of interpreting Titus 1:5, as if Paul himself shared the work of the Cretan mission. (On this point, see above and below.)
1st Timothy - 57 AD - handed off in person, in Troas, giving Timothy one week to appoint the Ephesian Elders Paul met at Miletus. This most natural conclusion has been frequently put off without justifiable cause, and only requires 2nd Corinthians to be written in late 56 AD. (Look again at the discussion of Illyricum, Timothy and 2nd Corinthians, above.) On the need to explain who qualified as elders, Paul had only now formed his own personal stance on the issue of how to appoint/recognize them, since his separation from Barnabas. Timothy had not seen Gentile Christian Elders since the Judaizers so easily overcame the "elders" appointed mainly by Barnabas, in Galatia. (For more on this point, see here.)
Philemon, Colossians, Ephesians, Philippians - 60 to 62 AD - The turnover from Felix to Festus in 59 puts Paul's arrival in Rome in early 60 and his release at 62. Somewhere during this imprisonment, these four "Prison Epistles" went out in two waves. Tychicus took the first three to cities near Ephesus because Colosse's own Epaphras came down with a serious illness. Then Epaphras (Epaphroditus) took Paul's thank you letter back to his new friends in Philippi. Most of this affects nothing else in Pauline Chronology, of course, but we note that after 11-ish years, Philippi now has elders. They were most likely appointed by Paul at his last visit, when Luke left, just while Paul was composing 1st Timothy, on his way to Troas.
Titus - 62 AD - This letter was probably written from Illyricum, which strongly suggests that Paul must have planted a church in Dyrrachium in 55/56, as a sort of a rest stop/half-way point for those from the churches who were heading to Rome after Claudius' death. (Again, see discussion on 2nd Corinthians above.) In any event, the cheapest and most efficient itinerary from Rome to Nicopolis was taking the Appian Way to one of the ferries at Brindisi (Brundisium) that sailed directly over to Dyrrachium. From there, the road south leads to Nicopolis. Later on, Titus winds up north of Dyrrachium, heading to Dalmatia. (A church in Dyrrachium is also attested by inscription, cited by the Jesuit scholar Farlati centuries ago - on which, look up Edwin E. Jacques.) Finally, a church in Dyrrachium could also explain where Erastus spent all his time after Acts 19:22, before heading to Corinth (2.Tim 4:20).
T.2. Titus, we presume, had remained on Crete since Paul left him there, at Fair Havens. The only question is, where had Titus been before? Obviously, considering this involves some conjecture, but it is probably necessary if we stick to the natural conclusion that Paul died in 64 AD. Besides, in what follows, only the details require conjecture, which is far more reasonable than inventing four years worth of additional travels.
T.3. We know Paul was at Crete at least once and we know Luke avoids mentioning Titus at least once. Putting these two points together with Titus 1:5 suggests Titus was present at Fair Havens. He must therefore have been part of Paul's sailing party, and he must have abandoned that party - probably because Paul knew from experience that their odds of shipwreck were high, and so one of them had to survive so the churches could know what had happened in case Paul really did die at sea. Besides that, Titus had been on Crete recently, after which he must have visited Caesarea and gotten on board with Luke and Aristarchus.
T.4. Now, if Luke intended Acts at least partly as a defense of Paul for his trial at Rome, and if Paul's three companions were also somehow under the centurion's special jurisdiction (perhaps as witnesses being shipped in at state's expense?) then Titus disappearing at Fair Havens could also explain why Luke deleted Titus from the record. Since only citizens or their slaves were allowed to testify in Rome, Paul (seriously) could simply have 'enslaved' his three friends (a loophole that Roman Law could not have anticipated!) planning to 'free' them later.
T.5. In any event, we know Paul was at Fair Havens and we know Luke avoids mentioning Titus. Somehow or another, Titus must have been at Fair Havens, at which point Paul told him to continue the work which he (Titus only, not Titus with Paul) had already begun. Paul also told Titus to appoint elders in every church before he left the island. This point evidently failed to get through to Titus, probably because the church in Antioch made crisis-level decisions without elders (Acts 15:2). Therefore, Paul had to explain to Titus what elders were because (like Timothy from 50 to 57 AD) Titus had never been part of a church that had elders. (As mentioned above, for more on Paul's evolving opinions about elders, see this post.)
T.6. It should be clear now what I meant that only the details require conjecture. The bottom line on dating Titus should be, in my humble opinion, that IF Paul died under Nero in 64 AD (which has always been the most natural conclusion to draw from Tacitus' report on the great fire and from Paul's second letter to Timothy) then Titus must have been at Fair Havens. It's the only time we know for certain that Paul was there, and educated guesswork to get Titus there with Paul is far more reasonable than inventing entirely new travels for both of them.
T.7. Note well: The only necessary conclusions on this point are that Titus was with Paul at Fair Havens, had previously begun the mission there without Paul's assistance, nevertheless received instructions from Paul at Fair Havens (about how to finish what Titus had begun), and remained on Crete when Paul sailed away. For all we know, Titus could have just wandered onto the beach at the right time, simply by divine providence - but of course, this is not my argument. This is only to make clear that all suppositional details in the previous paragraphs were included merely to show at least one very plausible scenario which might have occurred. Most of Titus' itinerary will simply have to remain a mystery, but again (for the last time) this is far better than inventing four years worth of additional travels.
2nd Timothy - early 64 AD - before the fire, and with enough time for Timothy to receive the letter and still have a chance to reach Rome "before winter". Tacitus' account of events in this year are a much more convincing explanation for the tradition that Paul was considered worthy of execution.
Spain - N/A - Paul's plans didn't always materialize. The trick is to realize, there is no Spain. ;-)
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There you go. That's Pauline Chronology in a nutshell, according to me. Someday, of course, I really must write this up properly, supporting these dates and arguments to the strongest extent possible. Until then - or if I never get around to it - this is pretty much the basics of everything I've got to say on the subject.
If anyone wants to start working on this before I get to it, please feel free. I've got enough else to do for the next several years writing up everything that goes from 9 BC until 37 AD. I don't mind sharing at all.
Personal Observations: A lot of the difficulties that get ironed out in this treatment happen to reveal, I believe, strong institutional/religious biases in previous faith-based scholarship on Pauline Chronology. I deeply wish I didn't have to bring it up, but it really does need to be noticed. Certain aspects of the traditional, ecclesiastical dogmas about the Jerusalem Council and the lateness of the so-called "Pastoral Epistles" seem to be partly responsible for what has kept Pauline Chronology in dispute for so long. If all three "Pastorals" get to occupy an extra four years of vague, non-contextual space-time, then Titus and Timothy look more like permanent local preachers. This may seem shocking, but it must be considered.
Since my own past experience and outspoken preference for house churches is well known, I must admit this sequence could alter (or cleanse) our view of Pauline ecclesiology somewhat. That may be debatable but Paul's ecclesiology does not have to be ours, at any rate. No christian assembly that I know of is currently following Paul's pattern precisely. Besides this, the "Descriptive/Prescriptive" argument is a much more impenetrable defense than pre-emptive gerrymandering of dates (whether or not that is even partly what has been going on).
In any event, the historian's (or exegete's) job is to judge based on facts in evidence, and not to consider potential relevance of any conclusions beforehand. Given the evidence (as laid out above) I would contend that Pauline Chronology seems to have been unfairly beset by institutional biases, although much of it is undoubtedly subconscious. Of course, if it is fully aware, such cheating simply must come to an end.
I would also contend - and here is why this all had to be said - that this mostly explains why no one has solved Pauline Chronology more efficiently or sufficiently than this, before now, and why I myself (an untrained, if unashamed amateur) managed to happen upon it. In any case, if I've put together the argument I think I have, it deserves to be looked at. And no matter who looks here, none of us should allow ourselves to manipulate the data to support our church government practices. Pauline ecclesiology was primitive.
It is a simple historical fact that nobody in the New Testament performed the job duties of a medieval priest or a protestant "pastor". That's really not a big deal, unless we feel the need to pretend otherwise. It's really not even a problem, unless we let tradition or dogma inhibit us from viewing the full context of Paul's letters, as they properly ought to be viewed.
I've been going over this and over this for five years, and unless I'm missing something very significant, I believe I can make the following statement with all confidence.
This really must be the most likely solution to Pauline Chronology, period.
Your comments, questions and challenges are warmly invited, as long as this post remains online.
The three points that will chiefly distinguish this chronology are as follows:
Antioch's relief gift had to be money (not grain) and so had to be earlyFixing those three points amidst all the other significant data requires essentially one specific alignment of all other major events. Furthermore, this process compels us to make only one creative decision - to put Titus at Fair Havens with Paul, thereby concluding Paul had no part in Titus' earlier mission on Crete. To be sure, this offers a reading of Titus 1:5 which is far more economical and less speculative, historically, than all other suggested reconstructions for Titus' travels.
Paul's plans changed to include Rome when the Emperor Claudius died
The best place to put Paul's execution is after the great fire of Rome
As a package, these points comprise my original contribution to the field of Pauline Chronology, which is simply a new set of boundaries for all other considerations. Based on solid historical judgments, those boundaries happen to be very tight. This is fortunate. The overarching framework of arguments and possibilities, of course, we all owe to many, many scholars and researchers who have gone before. Therefore, beyond the above points, all other evidence should be well established and easily locatable in standard reference manuals.
Note: In the rough sketch that now follows, many points are referred to ahead of time, and again after the fact. To anyone who has studied these issues, the overall argument should (hopefully) come across best if you read straight through this post, without skipping around at first.
========================================
Conversion - early 34 AD - No Roman Emperor ever "gave" Damascus to Nabatea but King Aretas sent the Ethnarch to get Paul at a time when Aretas was still active north of his own territory, which must have been before Tiberius died. It could not have been after. Among other reasons, we know this because the prefect Macro (successor to Sejanus) was essentially running the empire all year long in 37 AD, so Caligula was highly unlikely to reverse policy on Nabatea after Herod Antipas' letter. For more details, see here.
Antioch's relief commission - 44 AD - Because they could not have sent hundreds of ox carts with grain from the coast, especially in the middle of a famine, the church in Antioch must have sent Paul and Barnabas with money. That money was no good unless it came early enough that the church in Jerusalem could begin surreptitiously building a stockpile. (Even if they were going to give it away, the food bank had to built up in secret. Otherwise, what was the point?) Therefore, Paul and Barnabas did not wait until the famine itself (46/47 AD) and therefore Acts 11:30 and 12:25 cannot be extracted from Acts 12. If we leave Acts 12 just as it is written, then the relief visit happens in 44 AD and thus Galatians 2 cannot apply to an inclusive 14 year difference between Paul's conversion and this visit. Therefore, Galatians 2 most likely refers to the Council of Acts 15, despite those who still attempt to suppose an additional visit before the Council. For more on famine relief logistics, see here.
[***UPDATE (7/31/10): If Agrippa died in March of 44, as holds the consensus, then the relief delivery and that traumatic Passover in which Luke sets it, both, belong to 43 AD. Since Galatians 2 cannot refer to any year that's actually before the famine, anyway, this update is a moot point chronologically speaking, as far as affecting the rest of this timeline. Update 2: Red color added to text in paragraph above. For more, see this post. ***]
Galatians - 50 AD - Writen to the four South Galatian churches of Acts; before the Epistle of James, but after the council; it was carried by Titus & Luke, who visited all four churches and went on to wait for Paul at Troas (the one city everyone knew how to find, in West Asia Minor); that Titus' circumcision *was even an issue* and *could have been* "compelled" strongly suggests that this visit was part of the council occasion and virtually confirms that Galatians 2 refers to Acts 15. Further, the fact that Paul expects the Galatians to know who Titus is most likely means Titus himself was the letter carrier. As a witness to the events in Jerusalem, Titus was the perfect one to send, and he could easily have been holding Jerusalem's letter in reserve, as additional support for Paul's position. Thus, Paul had no need to mention the shorter letter because Titus was probably carrying it also - presumably on loan from missionally-minded Antioch. (For even more on Galatians and the Council, see here, here, here, and (again) here.)
1st & 2nd Thessalonians - 51 AD - standard view easily dated by Gallio's time in Corinth. We should note here, for later, that Timothy seems to have trouble sticking with his assignment, and keeps running to Paul for assistance. He's going to do this again, 6 years later, in Ephesus.
Departure from Corinth - 52 AD - Paul must have talked with Peter in Jerusalem, about Corinth, somewhere in the middle or the end of sailing season in 52. At least, that is necessary in order for Peter to have sailed to Corinth here in 53 and caused so much trouble (53/54) in unfortunate preparation for a summer of letters going back and forth between Corinth and Paul, in 54. (On which date, see note at top, and see below.) Incidentally, many of the controversies that arose in Corinth around the time of Peter's visit bear striking parallels to the letter of Jerusalem, which suggests Paul had not shown it to Corinth, but that Peter had. Controversies over tongues and healing are also, most likely, symptomatic of Peter's visit.
Epistle of James - c.52 or 51 AD - Paul's visit to Jerusalem in 52 also means James' letter had probably been written by 52, because there is no chance James and Paul did not see each other during this visit, and that makes this the first chance they had to sit down and iron out their perceived differences [over things they didn't really disagree about, except perhaps semantically]. Circumcision was not argued in James' Epistle, and we have no record that James ever heard Paul say the things written in Galatians, before Galatians was written. James must have been responding, in part, to things Paul wrote in his first letter. (Church Councils are not magic cure-alls. They just aren't.)
1st Corinthians - 54 AD, before October - This is an especially critical point for aligning the rest of Paul's dates, and it is based on the fact that Paul talks about travel plans but does not include Rome. The Jews weren't allowed back in until Claudius died, and Paul's trip to Illyricum (Western Provincia Macedonia) must have been planned as part of preparations for going to Rome. Ephesus is also when Paul began speaking of Rome, according to Acts. Further, this letter must be 54, and could not be 53 because Claudius' death also best explains what interrupts Paul's stated plans to sail after Pentecost (which generally assured safe sailing weather; by the way, Paul's also had all of his first three shipwrecks by now).
2nd Corinthians - 56 AD, around November - Aristarchus, Secundus and Sopater evidently knew how to get through the Greek hinterland (Acts 20:4a). This letter mentions Macedonians currently visiting Corinth and Paul sounds as if he is following them there shortly. This must be at the end of Paul's Macedonian trip, for two reasons. First, the trip to the Adriatic and back (Acts 20:1-2 & Romans 15:19) must have taken over a year, and second, Timothy must have intercepted Paul in Thessalonica on Paul's way back from Dyrrachium, before Paul headed to Corinth. Timothy, of course, had been struggling in Ephesus since Paul left him there to go into Macedonia, and must have spent the winter of 54/55 building up enough angst & frustration to make Timothy, desperately, flee Ephesus to go seek out Paul's help (just as Timothy had done at least twice before, in Thessalonica). All of this means 2nd Corinthians cannot have been written until after Paul's trip to Illyricum, probably only a month or two before Paul himself returned to Achaia. Timothy simply had to leave Ephesus in time to be in Macedonia with Paul, in time to co-sign this epistle. (See also discussion on 1st Timothy, below.)
Romans - 57 AD - the turnover from Felix to Festus in 59 (not 60) is made necessary here by one of our three key starting points (at top) - that Paul was most likely executed in connection with the great fire of Rome. Again, confirming this point removes the need for those often but ill-conceived (and certainly purely contrived) later itineraries of Paul, Timothy and Titus. In fact, scholarship through the ages has generally considered Paul's death in 64 to be the first and most likely option. The only real obstacle to this has been an over-rigidity of interpreting Titus 1:5, as if Paul himself shared the work of the Cretan mission. (On this point, see above and below.)
1st Timothy - 57 AD - handed off in person, in Troas, giving Timothy one week to appoint the Ephesian Elders Paul met at Miletus. This most natural conclusion has been frequently put off without justifiable cause, and only requires 2nd Corinthians to be written in late 56 AD. (Look again at the discussion of Illyricum, Timothy and 2nd Corinthians, above.) On the need to explain who qualified as elders, Paul had only now formed his own personal stance on the issue of how to appoint/recognize them, since his separation from Barnabas. Timothy had not seen Gentile Christian Elders since the Judaizers so easily overcame the "elders" appointed mainly by Barnabas, in Galatia. (For more on this point, see here.)
Philemon, Colossians, Ephesians, Philippians - 60 to 62 AD - The turnover from Felix to Festus in 59 puts Paul's arrival in Rome in early 60 and his release at 62. Somewhere during this imprisonment, these four "Prison Epistles" went out in two waves. Tychicus took the first three to cities near Ephesus because Colosse's own Epaphras came down with a serious illness. Then Epaphras (Epaphroditus) took Paul's thank you letter back to his new friends in Philippi. Most of this affects nothing else in Pauline Chronology, of course, but we note that after 11-ish years, Philippi now has elders. They were most likely appointed by Paul at his last visit, when Luke left, just while Paul was composing 1st Timothy, on his way to Troas.
Titus - 62 AD - This letter was probably written from Illyricum, which strongly suggests that Paul must have planted a church in Dyrrachium in 55/56, as a sort of a rest stop/half-way point for those from the churches who were heading to Rome after Claudius' death. (Again, see discussion on 2nd Corinthians above.) In any event, the cheapest and most efficient itinerary from Rome to Nicopolis was taking the Appian Way to one of the ferries at Brindisi (Brundisium) that sailed directly over to Dyrrachium. From there, the road south leads to Nicopolis. Later on, Titus winds up north of Dyrrachium, heading to Dalmatia. (A church in Dyrrachium is also attested by inscription, cited by the Jesuit scholar Farlati centuries ago - on which, look up Edwin E. Jacques.) Finally, a church in Dyrrachium could also explain where Erastus spent all his time after Acts 19:22, before heading to Corinth (2.Tim 4:20).
T.2. Titus, we presume, had remained on Crete since Paul left him there, at Fair Havens. The only question is, where had Titus been before? Obviously, considering this involves some conjecture, but it is probably necessary if we stick to the natural conclusion that Paul died in 64 AD. Besides, in what follows, only the details require conjecture, which is far more reasonable than inventing four years worth of additional travels.
T.3. We know Paul was at Crete at least once and we know Luke avoids mentioning Titus at least once. Putting these two points together with Titus 1:5 suggests Titus was present at Fair Havens. He must therefore have been part of Paul's sailing party, and he must have abandoned that party - probably because Paul knew from experience that their odds of shipwreck were high, and so one of them had to survive so the churches could know what had happened in case Paul really did die at sea. Besides that, Titus had been on Crete recently, after which he must have visited Caesarea and gotten on board with Luke and Aristarchus.
T.4. Now, if Luke intended Acts at least partly as a defense of Paul for his trial at Rome, and if Paul's three companions were also somehow under the centurion's special jurisdiction (perhaps as witnesses being shipped in at state's expense?) then Titus disappearing at Fair Havens could also explain why Luke deleted Titus from the record. Since only citizens or their slaves were allowed to testify in Rome, Paul (seriously) could simply have 'enslaved' his three friends (a loophole that Roman Law could not have anticipated!) planning to 'free' them later.
T.5. In any event, we know Paul was at Fair Havens and we know Luke avoids mentioning Titus. Somehow or another, Titus must have been at Fair Havens, at which point Paul told him to continue the work which he (Titus only, not Titus with Paul) had already begun. Paul also told Titus to appoint elders in every church before he left the island. This point evidently failed to get through to Titus, probably because the church in Antioch made crisis-level decisions without elders (Acts 15:2). Therefore, Paul had to explain to Titus what elders were because (like Timothy from 50 to 57 AD) Titus had never been part of a church that had elders. (As mentioned above, for more on Paul's evolving opinions about elders, see this post.)
T.6. It should be clear now what I meant that only the details require conjecture. The bottom line on dating Titus should be, in my humble opinion, that IF Paul died under Nero in 64 AD (which has always been the most natural conclusion to draw from Tacitus' report on the great fire and from Paul's second letter to Timothy) then Titus must have been at Fair Havens. It's the only time we know for certain that Paul was there, and educated guesswork to get Titus there with Paul is far more reasonable than inventing entirely new travels for both of them.
T.7. Note well: The only necessary conclusions on this point are that Titus was with Paul at Fair Havens, had previously begun the mission there without Paul's assistance, nevertheless received instructions from Paul at Fair Havens (about how to finish what Titus had begun), and remained on Crete when Paul sailed away. For all we know, Titus could have just wandered onto the beach at the right time, simply by divine providence - but of course, this is not my argument. This is only to make clear that all suppositional details in the previous paragraphs were included merely to show at least one very plausible scenario which might have occurred. Most of Titus' itinerary will simply have to remain a mystery, but again (for the last time) this is far better than inventing four years worth of additional travels.
2nd Timothy - early 64 AD - before the fire, and with enough time for Timothy to receive the letter and still have a chance to reach Rome "before winter". Tacitus' account of events in this year are a much more convincing explanation for the tradition that Paul was considered worthy of execution.
Spain - N/A - Paul's plans didn't always materialize. The trick is to realize, there is no Spain. ;-)
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There you go. That's Pauline Chronology in a nutshell, according to me. Someday, of course, I really must write this up properly, supporting these dates and arguments to the strongest extent possible. Until then - or if I never get around to it - this is pretty much the basics of everything I've got to say on the subject.
If anyone wants to start working on this before I get to it, please feel free. I've got enough else to do for the next several years writing up everything that goes from 9 BC until 37 AD. I don't mind sharing at all.
Personal Observations: A lot of the difficulties that get ironed out in this treatment happen to reveal, I believe, strong institutional/religious biases in previous faith-based scholarship on Pauline Chronology. I deeply wish I didn't have to bring it up, but it really does need to be noticed. Certain aspects of the traditional, ecclesiastical dogmas about the Jerusalem Council and the lateness of the so-called "Pastoral Epistles" seem to be partly responsible for what has kept Pauline Chronology in dispute for so long. If all three "Pastorals" get to occupy an extra four years of vague, non-contextual space-time, then Titus and Timothy look more like permanent local preachers. This may seem shocking, but it must be considered.
Since my own past experience and outspoken preference for house churches is well known, I must admit this sequence could alter (or cleanse) our view of Pauline ecclesiology somewhat. That may be debatable but Paul's ecclesiology does not have to be ours, at any rate. No christian assembly that I know of is currently following Paul's pattern precisely. Besides this, the "Descriptive/Prescriptive" argument is a much more impenetrable defense than pre-emptive gerrymandering of dates (whether or not that is even partly what has been going on).
In any event, the historian's (or exegete's) job is to judge based on facts in evidence, and not to consider potential relevance of any conclusions beforehand. Given the evidence (as laid out above) I would contend that Pauline Chronology seems to have been unfairly beset by institutional biases, although much of it is undoubtedly subconscious. Of course, if it is fully aware, such cheating simply must come to an end.
I would also contend - and here is why this all had to be said - that this mostly explains why no one has solved Pauline Chronology more efficiently or sufficiently than this, before now, and why I myself (an untrained, if unashamed amateur) managed to happen upon it. In any case, if I've put together the argument I think I have, it deserves to be looked at. And no matter who looks here, none of us should allow ourselves to manipulate the data to support our church government practices. Pauline ecclesiology was primitive.
It is a simple historical fact that nobody in the New Testament performed the job duties of a medieval priest or a protestant "pastor". That's really not a big deal, unless we feel the need to pretend otherwise. It's really not even a problem, unless we let tradition or dogma inhibit us from viewing the full context of Paul's letters, as they properly ought to be viewed.
I've been going over this and over this for five years, and unless I'm missing something very significant, I believe I can make the following statement with all confidence.
This really must be the most likely solution to Pauline Chronology, period.
Your comments, questions and challenges are warmly invited, as long as this post remains online.
September 09, 2009
Dating Paul's "Conversion"
IF the Arabian (Nabatean) King Aretas ever occupied Damascus, it would have been before 37 AD. It could not have been after. Ogg missed this. Jewett missed this. Bowersock pointed it out in 1983 and few have acknowledged it since. The historical context is vital to Pauline chronology AND to the chronology of the earliest church in Jerusalem.
Here's the very-skinny. In 20 BC, the Kingdom of Zenodorus was granted to Herod the Great even though it had been promised to Nabatea. The Nabateans made trouble in Trachonitis until Aretas betrothed his daughter to Antipas (c.1 BC/1 AD) and Philip managed to forge good relations with the Nabateans in his Tetrarchy. But Antipas broke the treaty when he married Herodias (28/29 AD) and Philip's death (33/34 AD) filled the old Kingdom of Zenodorus with an absolute power vacuum.
Tiberius (undoubtedly with, through or by proxy of Macro, the new Praetorian Prefect after Sejanus) officially annexed Philip's Tetrarchy into Provincia Syria. But Syria had been suffering from a power vacuum of its own. The Proconsul Lamia was an absentee Governor for ten years until Pomponius Flaccus [not to be confused with the Egyptian Prefect hated by Philo] arrived in 32. But Flaccus died in office in 33 and Tiberius (and/or Macro) sent L. Vitellius in 35, more than a whole year after Philip and Flaccus had both died.
Presumably, Vitellius was to establish the new status of Philip's Tetrarchy, but Vitellius had his hands full immediately with conflict on all sides. Dealing with the Parthian invasion of Armenia occupied Vitellius' first two summers while the Governor also sent one of his four Legions to help Cappadocia against a mountain tribe of Cilicians. Meanwhile, Herod Antipas had taken the liberty of sending his own small army to occupy the strategic fortress-city of Gamala in the Golan Heights. But while Antipas was at the Euphrates making peace with the Parthian King Artabanus, the Nabatean army took Gamala and crushed Herod's army.
By early 37, Vitellius was marching south, but purposely dawdled, resenting Antipas for taking credit about the Euphrates treaty in a letter to the Emperor. Tiberius (and/or Macro) had ordered Vitellius to avenge Antipas, but Vitellius lingered in Jerusalem after Passover until news arrived of Tiberius' death. At that, the Governor took his Legions back north. Gamala had already been reclaimed (officially for Syria) and Aretas had long since retreated. And just by coincidence, almost simultaneously, in Rome, the new Emperor Caligula (and his chief advisor, Macro) were appointing Antipas' nephew, Herod Agrippa, as the new King of the old Kingdom/Tetrarchy.
According to our records, Aretas did not attack or press through Trachonitis under Agrippa. It is extremely doubtful that Aretas could have managed possessions from the other side of Agrippa. And Aretas was somewhere in his 60's already, at least. He had been king since 9/8 BC. Two years after Caligula made Agrippa King of Trachonitis and the Golan, Aretas died, in 39 AD.
That's the whole skinny. Now here's the point.
It had long been assumed, by a very poor reading of 2nd Corinthians 11:32, that Aretas must have been granted Damascus by Rome, and the next argument went that since Tiberius sent Vitellius after Aretas, it must have been the nutsy Caligula. These arguments required skepticism of Josephus on Gamala as the point of battle, since the Golan was not an official "boundary" between Antipas and Aretas. But Josephus said Gamala, so the territorial issues must go back to the old grudge over Zenodorus. Only Bowersock (Roman Arabia, 1983) makes complete sense out of Tacitus, Josephus and Paul on this issue.
My own tiny contribution to this conversation is that Macro alone should be enough to debunk the old argument that Caligula suddenly did an about face from Tiberian policy. For all practical purposes, Macro was running the Empire in all twelve months of 37 AD, besides which Caligula never showed any interest in foriegn policy, except for the Temple worship fiasco in 39/40. Caligula merely gave his 'uncle Herod' a Kingdom as a reward for his friendship in recent years. Herod's Kingship, of course, is another issue the old arguments failed to deal with. If Caligula had wanted to give Damascus to anyone, it should have been Agrippa.
The Conclusion: Paul's "three years" in Arabia must end before winter of 36/37 and therefore his conversion must be dated to 33/34.
The Challenge: If we also take 33 as the year of Christ's Passion and Pentecost, what does that do to our view of the earliest church in Jerusalem? Tentatively clinging to 30 AD, which has become increasingly difficult to defend in recent decades except by appeal to tradition, seems to be motivated in some cases by a bias towards keeping Acts 1-8 in a long stretch of years. I think it was less than four months, but that's a story for some other time...
Here's the very-skinny. In 20 BC, the Kingdom of Zenodorus was granted to Herod the Great even though it had been promised to Nabatea. The Nabateans made trouble in Trachonitis until Aretas betrothed his daughter to Antipas (c.1 BC/1 AD) and Philip managed to forge good relations with the Nabateans in his Tetrarchy. But Antipas broke the treaty when he married Herodias (28/29 AD) and Philip's death (33/34 AD) filled the old Kingdom of Zenodorus with an absolute power vacuum.
Tiberius (undoubtedly with, through or by proxy of Macro, the new Praetorian Prefect after Sejanus) officially annexed Philip's Tetrarchy into Provincia Syria. But Syria had been suffering from a power vacuum of its own. The Proconsul Lamia was an absentee Governor for ten years until Pomponius Flaccus [not to be confused with the Egyptian Prefect hated by Philo] arrived in 32. But Flaccus died in office in 33 and Tiberius (and/or Macro) sent L. Vitellius in 35, more than a whole year after Philip and Flaccus had both died.
Presumably, Vitellius was to establish the new status of Philip's Tetrarchy, but Vitellius had his hands full immediately with conflict on all sides. Dealing with the Parthian invasion of Armenia occupied Vitellius' first two summers while the Governor also sent one of his four Legions to help Cappadocia against a mountain tribe of Cilicians. Meanwhile, Herod Antipas had taken the liberty of sending his own small army to occupy the strategic fortress-city of Gamala in the Golan Heights. But while Antipas was at the Euphrates making peace with the Parthian King Artabanus, the Nabatean army took Gamala and crushed Herod's army.
By early 37, Vitellius was marching south, but purposely dawdled, resenting Antipas for taking credit about the Euphrates treaty in a letter to the Emperor. Tiberius (and/or Macro) had ordered Vitellius to avenge Antipas, but Vitellius lingered in Jerusalem after Passover until news arrived of Tiberius' death. At that, the Governor took his Legions back north. Gamala had already been reclaimed (officially for Syria) and Aretas had long since retreated. And just by coincidence, almost simultaneously, in Rome, the new Emperor Caligula (and his chief advisor, Macro) were appointing Antipas' nephew, Herod Agrippa, as the new King of the old Kingdom/Tetrarchy.
According to our records, Aretas did not attack or press through Trachonitis under Agrippa. It is extremely doubtful that Aretas could have managed possessions from the other side of Agrippa. And Aretas was somewhere in his 60's already, at least. He had been king since 9/8 BC. Two years after Caligula made Agrippa King of Trachonitis and the Golan, Aretas died, in 39 AD.
That's the whole skinny. Now here's the point.
It had long been assumed, by a very poor reading of 2nd Corinthians 11:32, that Aretas must have been granted Damascus by Rome, and the next argument went that since Tiberius sent Vitellius after Aretas, it must have been the nutsy Caligula. These arguments required skepticism of Josephus on Gamala as the point of battle, since the Golan was not an official "boundary" between Antipas and Aretas. But Josephus said Gamala, so the territorial issues must go back to the old grudge over Zenodorus. Only Bowersock (Roman Arabia, 1983) makes complete sense out of Tacitus, Josephus and Paul on this issue.
My own tiny contribution to this conversation is that Macro alone should be enough to debunk the old argument that Caligula suddenly did an about face from Tiberian policy. For all practical purposes, Macro was running the Empire in all twelve months of 37 AD, besides which Caligula never showed any interest in foriegn policy, except for the Temple worship fiasco in 39/40. Caligula merely gave his 'uncle Herod' a Kingdom as a reward for his friendship in recent years. Herod's Kingship, of course, is another issue the old arguments failed to deal with. If Caligula had wanted to give Damascus to anyone, it should have been Agrippa.
The Conclusion: Paul's "three years" in Arabia must end before winter of 36/37 and therefore his conversion must be dated to 33/34.
The Challenge: If we also take 33 as the year of Christ's Passion and Pentecost, what does that do to our view of the earliest church in Jerusalem? Tentatively clinging to 30 AD, which has become increasingly difficult to defend in recent decades except by appeal to tradition, seems to be motivated in some cases by a bias towards keeping Acts 1-8 in a long stretch of years. I think it was less than four months, but that's a story for some other time...
March 16, 2009
Josephus on 9/8/7 BC (3.5)
This post is a bridge between the first and last halves of this series.
Post #1: Traditional scholarship on the date of Alexander & Aristobulus' execution (by their father, Herod the Great) has been rightly held up as accurate but perhaps without stringent examination. A face value reading of Josephus' Antiquities shows events during the Governorship of Saturninus (mid-9 to mid-6 BC) are difficult to date with precision. Working on this issue may also help us determine how long Herod the great remained a "subject" of Augustus Caesar, after the accusation of Syllaeus the Nabatean (which occured about November of 9 BC).
Post #2: A review of events in Dio Cassius shows Augustus moving back and forth between Rome and Germany in 9 and 8 BC. The logistics of communication between Caesar and Herod (including the weight of Caesar's decision and the travel itinerary for Nicolaus of Damascus) must be weighed against various factors, including the possible lengths and end points of the Emperor's 8 BC campaign. On balance, Nicolaus probably missed Augustus in the spring and had to wait until Autumn. Herod's other envoy, Olympus, absolutely waited in Rome for Caesar's return because Olympus sailed. (Whereas Nicolaus may have gone over land.)
Post #3: A generous attempt to put the execution of Alexander and Aristobulus at the end of 8 BC is shown to stretch the limits of plausibility to a very high degree. It would also require Nicolas to sail back to Palestine during October-November. Without other evidence to demand further consideration of this scenario, it must be abandoned. The only alternative is to show that Nicolaus and Olympus both stayed in Rome over the winter of 8/7 BC. Therefore, Herod does not execute Alexander and Aristobulus until shortly after Nicolaus sails home from Italy in 7 BC.
Point One: The traditional date holds up - with a strengthened position, if I have examined these things fairly enough. This was worth investigating thoroughly and great exercise for me, besides.
Point Two: My ulterior motive in all this is to more closely consider what I believe are solid grounds for the plausible reconstruction of an actual Roman Census in Judea under Governor Saturninus in 7 BC.
Preview of Future Posts in this Series: If Nicolas did in fact miss Caesar in the spring of 8 BC, as seems likely, then Augustus remained cold to Herod for nearly one full year - and Herod remained a "subject" of Caesar (and thus essentially of Rome as well) for the same span of time, plus a seven week courrier delay. Herod's demotion in status is usually not addressed as such an extended situation, partly because Josephus scholars don't necessarily include Dio Cassius' accounts of the same time period among their published considerations. It leads to an important consideration, namely - Which is more difficult? To imagine Augustus making an empty threat with no consequences that lingered for almost one full year? Or to speculate on what significance the demotion to "subject" had in practical matters, and to what extent it was able to take effect during the (almost entire) year 8 BC?
Preview of my Conclusion: Herod's punishment in late 9 BC is often treated as both brief and trivial. It was almost certainly not brief. Examination of other evidence will strongly suggest it was also very far from being trivial.
Related Topics also to be Covered: (1) The confusing details of Luke's testimony about this census and the extent to which those details may or may not be used as a source for Roman history. (2) Reconstruction for the sake of argument - assuming Saturninus did receive that order. (3) Examining the date and provenance of the oath of loyalty to Caesar and Herod. (4) Josephus' use of the term "subject" and similar usage in Strabo and elsewhere. (5) Others - TBA.
Post #1: Traditional scholarship on the date of Alexander & Aristobulus' execution (by their father, Herod the Great) has been rightly held up as accurate but perhaps without stringent examination. A face value reading of Josephus' Antiquities shows events during the Governorship of Saturninus (mid-9 to mid-6 BC) are difficult to date with precision. Working on this issue may also help us determine how long Herod the great remained a "subject" of Augustus Caesar, after the accusation of Syllaeus the Nabatean (which occured about November of 9 BC).
Post #2: A review of events in Dio Cassius shows Augustus moving back and forth between Rome and Germany in 9 and 8 BC. The logistics of communication between Caesar and Herod (including the weight of Caesar's decision and the travel itinerary for Nicolaus of Damascus) must be weighed against various factors, including the possible lengths and end points of the Emperor's 8 BC campaign. On balance, Nicolaus probably missed Augustus in the spring and had to wait until Autumn. Herod's other envoy, Olympus, absolutely waited in Rome for Caesar's return because Olympus sailed. (Whereas Nicolaus may have gone over land.)
Post #3: A generous attempt to put the execution of Alexander and Aristobulus at the end of 8 BC is shown to stretch the limits of plausibility to a very high degree. It would also require Nicolas to sail back to Palestine during October-November. Without other evidence to demand further consideration of this scenario, it must be abandoned. The only alternative is to show that Nicolaus and Olympus both stayed in Rome over the winter of 8/7 BC. Therefore, Herod does not execute Alexander and Aristobulus until shortly after Nicolaus sails home from Italy in 7 BC.
Point One: The traditional date holds up - with a strengthened position, if I have examined these things fairly enough. This was worth investigating thoroughly and great exercise for me, besides.
Point Two: My ulterior motive in all this is to more closely consider what I believe are solid grounds for the plausible reconstruction of an actual Roman Census in Judea under Governor Saturninus in 7 BC.
Preview of Future Posts in this Series: If Nicolas did in fact miss Caesar in the spring of 8 BC, as seems likely, then Augustus remained cold to Herod for nearly one full year - and Herod remained a "subject" of Caesar (and thus essentially of Rome as well) for the same span of time, plus a seven week courrier delay. Herod's demotion in status is usually not addressed as such an extended situation, partly because Josephus scholars don't necessarily include Dio Cassius' accounts of the same time period among their published considerations. It leads to an important consideration, namely - Which is more difficult? To imagine Augustus making an empty threat with no consequences that lingered for almost one full year? Or to speculate on what significance the demotion to "subject" had in practical matters, and to what extent it was able to take effect during the (almost entire) year 8 BC?
Preview of my Conclusion: Herod's punishment in late 9 BC is often treated as both brief and trivial. It was almost certainly not brief. Examination of other evidence will strongly suggest it was also very far from being trivial.
Related Topics also to be Covered: (1) The confusing details of Luke's testimony about this census and the extent to which those details may or may not be used as a source for Roman history. (2) Reconstruction for the sake of argument - assuming Saturninus did receive that order. (3) Examining the date and provenance of the oath of loyalty to Caesar and Herod. (4) Josephus' use of the term "subject" and similar usage in Strabo and elsewhere. (5) Others - TBA.
January 25, 2009
Josephus on 9/8/7 BC (2)
Herod the Great sent two emissaries to Rome in 8 BC. Determining what month they each saw the Emperor tells us not only which year Herod killed his sons, it also tells us how long the King remained a “subject” of Augustus instead of a friend.
Peter Swan says the funeral of Drusus in 9 BC was held in November or December. After my recent review of those events, I take early November. Since Augustus learns about Herod during the funeral week (or thereabouts) he might send his letter to Herod by mid-November, and the King can read its bad news as early as January 1st (ish). But then, even if Herod sent Nicolas of Damascus to Rome immediately, the ambassador couldn’t possibly arrive (overland including Asia Minor in Jan/Feb) any sooner than April 1st. The problem is that Augustus most likely left for Germany that April, and possibly as early as March. Further calculations make any overlap of these itineraries extremely unlikely. (If you trust me, skip the small print!)
In his commentary on Dio Cassius’ Year Book for 8 BC, Swan points out that Augustus left early enough to win an acclimation from his Legions “in the first half of the year”. (An inscription puts it in 9/8 BC.) That acclimation probably didn’t happen just because Caesar showed up, but Dio’s chronology and geography of German campaigns is sketchy to say the least, so it’s practically impossible to calculate the progress of the campaign itself. Still, the travel alone took at least a month, so we’d have to figure Augustus left Rome before mid-May at the absolute latest – and almost certainly sooner.
But how much sooner? Of course March was the traditional time for the start of campaigning, and Caesar could have left as soon as the Alps were passable so the German Legions could begin their campaign in March with him present. Then again, Augustus was 54, this particular campaign wasn’t necessarily the most urgent one he ever planned, and the Emperor might have simply preferred to leave in April. We just can’t say for sure.
In all, there’s a chance Nicolas saw Augustus in April. On the other hand, it’s more likely he did not. The odds may be even that Caesar left before or after April 1st, but there are plenty of factors which might have made Nicolas arrive late. It would have been characteristic of Augustus to sit on the news for a short time before writing the letter, and perhaps especially this year considering the funeral. Given the extra assumption (which I make unapologetically) that the demotion of Herod included ordering a census of Israel, the Emperor is even more likely to have weighed that decision for some days or weeks. The later Herod gets Augustus’ letter, the later Nicolas can depart – assuming Nicolas goes over land at all.
Also, once Herod sends Nicolas, many things can happen to delay the advisor’s trip. The mountains and snows of Turkey, crossing the Bosporous and the Adriatic in winter, built up fatigue, and the possibility that Nicolas himself was advancing in age – all these are possible factors which could easily cause the ambassador to reach Rome after April 1st. And none of this is to mention the other possibility that Herod allowed Nicolas to wait until sailing season. In that case, the ambassador absolutely misses the Emperor.
As a quick aside, when Herod sent Olympus to Rome the King was concerned that Nicolas might not have had a chance to see Augustus yet. But Olympus was sailing. That could mean that Nicolas sailed slightly earlier – but it could also mean merely that Herod knew how long it could sometimes take to get an audience with the Emperor. Either case is a point in the favor of time, not expedience.
There is more. Besides arriving before Caesar’s departure, Nicolas had to gain an audience, almost certainly by first securing an appointment. And Josephus’ narrative strongly implies Nicolas had some down time in Rome before seeing the Emperor. The Nabateans who turned against Syllaeus heard Nicolas was in town, found him and gave him not only ammunition for winning his case, but also the very excuse Nicolas needed before Augustus would even admit him. This meeting probably happened between setting and keeping an appointment with Caesar, but there’s a slight chance it means no appointment was granted until the stated purpose became agreeable.
At any rate, there was some downtime, so the window of opportunity had to be more than a few days. Nicolas can’t just catch Augustus on the way out of town! And we haven’t even begun to consider whether the Emperor even took new appointments in the weeks before a departure. (Not that I can think how to even begin researching that particular question!) The more factors we consider, the smaller the springtime window begins to look. And remember, the odds are greater that the Legions would acclaim Augustus after some length of time had gone into the campaign, not in the very first weeks of one.
Therefore, it seems far more likely that Nicolas did not see Augustus until after summer in 8 BC. Either way, we know Olympus definitely did not, because no matter how early his boat left Caesarea, it couldn’t possibly have arrived in Rome before June (especially not with a stop at Cilicia to go visit King Archelaus of Cappadocia).
Those are the basic conclusions. The ramifications for dating related events will come next...
Peter Swan says the funeral of Drusus in 9 BC was held in November or December. After my recent review of those events, I take early November. Since Augustus learns about Herod during the funeral week (or thereabouts) he might send his letter to Herod by mid-November, and the King can read its bad news as early as January 1st (ish). But then, even if Herod sent Nicolas of Damascus to Rome immediately, the ambassador couldn’t possibly arrive (overland including Asia Minor in Jan/Feb) any sooner than April 1st. The problem is that Augustus most likely left for Germany that April, and possibly as early as March. Further calculations make any overlap of these itineraries extremely unlikely. (If you trust me, skip the small print!)
In his commentary on Dio Cassius’ Year Book for 8 BC, Swan points out that Augustus left early enough to win an acclimation from his Legions “in the first half of the year”. (An inscription puts it in 9/8 BC.) That acclimation probably didn’t happen just because Caesar showed up, but Dio’s chronology and geography of German campaigns is sketchy to say the least, so it’s practically impossible to calculate the progress of the campaign itself. Still, the travel alone took at least a month, so we’d have to figure Augustus left Rome before mid-May at the absolute latest – and almost certainly sooner.
But how much sooner? Of course March was the traditional time for the start of campaigning, and Caesar could have left as soon as the Alps were passable so the German Legions could begin their campaign in March with him present. Then again, Augustus was 54, this particular campaign wasn’t necessarily the most urgent one he ever planned, and the Emperor might have simply preferred to leave in April. We just can’t say for sure.
In all, there’s a chance Nicolas saw Augustus in April. On the other hand, it’s more likely he did not. The odds may be even that Caesar left before or after April 1st, but there are plenty of factors which might have made Nicolas arrive late. It would have been characteristic of Augustus to sit on the news for a short time before writing the letter, and perhaps especially this year considering the funeral. Given the extra assumption (which I make unapologetically) that the demotion of Herod included ordering a census of Israel, the Emperor is even more likely to have weighed that decision for some days or weeks. The later Herod gets Augustus’ letter, the later Nicolas can depart – assuming Nicolas goes over land at all.
Also, once Herod sends Nicolas, many things can happen to delay the advisor’s trip. The mountains and snows of Turkey, crossing the Bosporous and the Adriatic in winter, built up fatigue, and the possibility that Nicolas himself was advancing in age – all these are possible factors which could easily cause the ambassador to reach Rome after April 1st. And none of this is to mention the other possibility that Herod allowed Nicolas to wait until sailing season. In that case, the ambassador absolutely misses the Emperor.
As a quick aside, when Herod sent Olympus to Rome the King was concerned that Nicolas might not have had a chance to see Augustus yet. But Olympus was sailing. That could mean that Nicolas sailed slightly earlier – but it could also mean merely that Herod knew how long it could sometimes take to get an audience with the Emperor. Either case is a point in the favor of time, not expedience.
There is more. Besides arriving before Caesar’s departure, Nicolas had to gain an audience, almost certainly by first securing an appointment. And Josephus’ narrative strongly implies Nicolas had some down time in Rome before seeing the Emperor. The Nabateans who turned against Syllaeus heard Nicolas was in town, found him and gave him not only ammunition for winning his case, but also the very excuse Nicolas needed before Augustus would even admit him. This meeting probably happened between setting and keeping an appointment with Caesar, but there’s a slight chance it means no appointment was granted until the stated purpose became agreeable.
At any rate, there was some downtime, so the window of opportunity had to be more than a few days. Nicolas can’t just catch Augustus on the way out of town! And we haven’t even begun to consider whether the Emperor even took new appointments in the weeks before a departure. (Not that I can think how to even begin researching that particular question!) The more factors we consider, the smaller the springtime window begins to look. And remember, the odds are greater that the Legions would acclaim Augustus after some length of time had gone into the campaign, not in the very first weeks of one.
Therefore, it seems far more likely that Nicolas did not see Augustus until after summer in 8 BC. Either way, we know Olympus definitely did not, because no matter how early his boat left Caesarea, it couldn’t possibly have arrived in Rome before June (especially not with a stop at Cilicia to go visit King Archelaus of Cappadocia).
Those are the basic conclusions. The ramifications for dating related events will come next...
January 24, 2009
Josephus on 9/8/7 BC (1)
In 7 BC, Herod the Great executed two of his sons for treason – Alexander and Aristobulus. At least, it happened in 7 BC according to major scholars on the subject as far back as 1885. [For the record, I agree, but there's more going on here. Keep reading.] Some of them admit the date is an approximation, which is technically correct. Daniel R. Schwartz went further, stating with more precise vagueness that it could have been 8 or 7 BC, and pointing out, “the dates von Gutschmid offered as approximations have all too often been accepted as canonical.” (Agrippa I, p.39.n.4; p.206,n.15) Fair enough. So let's do better.
The passages in Josephus are not his most helpful, for chronological precision. A good starting point is the accession of Aretas IV, King of Nabatea, which happened in the winter of 9/8 BC according to various sources, including [if memory serves] coinage. That puts the visits of Herod’s ambassadors, Nicolas and Olympus, squarely in 8 BC, but more precision is needed. Estimating their separate travel itineraries leaves a range of possibilities, and it is admittedly (if barely) possible that the double execution might conceivably occur as early as October of 8 BC.
Schwartz, then, has good grounds for his rigorous skepticism (at least in this case). On the other hand, none of our evidence requires an expedient timetable and so 7 BC remains - statistically alone - far more likely than 8. But statistics isn't argument. As far as I can tell, one early justification for the consensus position was originally that Saturninus disappears from Josephus’ narrative shortly after the double execution [and Saturninus leaves mid-6] so Herod's sons were more likely to die in 7 than 8. This doesn’t seem like a very strong case, and I’d like to see better.
But of course, I'm not merely trying to be thorough. The question at hand depends on the travel itineraries of two embassies from Herod to Rome, which also determine whether Augustus reinstated Herod's friendship in early 8 or late 8, and give us a better picture of just how long Herod the Great was officially a "subject" of the Emperor.
To be honest, I'd never looked at the logistics of 8 BC quite this closely until I found Schwartz's footnote. So hooray for footnotes!
More later…
The passages in Josephus are not his most helpful, for chronological precision. A good starting point is the accession of Aretas IV, King of Nabatea, which happened in the winter of 9/8 BC according to various sources, including [if memory serves] coinage. That puts the visits of Herod’s ambassadors, Nicolas and Olympus, squarely in 8 BC, but more precision is needed. Estimating their separate travel itineraries leaves a range of possibilities, and it is admittedly (if barely) possible that the double execution might conceivably occur as early as October of 8 BC.
Schwartz, then, has good grounds for his rigorous skepticism (at least in this case). On the other hand, none of our evidence requires an expedient timetable and so 7 BC remains - statistically alone - far more likely than 8. But statistics isn't argument. As far as I can tell, one early justification for the consensus position was originally that Saturninus disappears from Josephus’ narrative shortly after the double execution [and Saturninus leaves mid-6] so Herod's sons were more likely to die in 7 than 8. This doesn’t seem like a very strong case, and I’d like to see better.
But of course, I'm not merely trying to be thorough. The question at hand depends on the travel itineraries of two embassies from Herod to Rome, which also determine whether Augustus reinstated Herod's friendship in early 8 or late 8, and give us a better picture of just how long Herod the Great was officially a "subject" of the Emperor.
To be honest, I'd never looked at the logistics of 8 BC quite this closely until I found Schwartz's footnote. So hooray for footnotes!
More later…
January 01, 2009
Dio & Josephus on Drusus & Herod
I really hope some Classical Scholar picks this up. Forgive me, the rest of you! ;)
Josephus says Syllaeus the Nabatean accused Herod before Caesar in late 9 BC. Cassius Dio says Augustus was barely in the city at all during that time, except for his stepson's funeral, briefly. As far as I can tell, no historian has yet published considerations about the potential impact of Drusus Nero's death on the Emperor's decision - which he evidently must have made during the funeral week - to turn Herod the Great from "a friend" into "a subject". My September 2006 draft-reconstruction of 9 BC still has it's flaws, so I've done a bit of closer scrutiny on it this week. Part One deals with Syllaeus, Part Two deals with Drusus, and Part Three ties them together, concluding with thoughts on the important question at hand.
Seriously now, I'll leave it to some seasoned professional to tighten my arguments and strengthen my conclusion, if such can be done. Until then, these rough sketches of someone else's future (possibly groundbreaking) scholarship really need to be here, online. (Click the links or scroll down through today's previous posts.)
Happy New Year, Y'all. :)
Josephus says Syllaeus the Nabatean accused Herod before Caesar in late 9 BC. Cassius Dio says Augustus was barely in the city at all during that time, except for his stepson's funeral, briefly. As far as I can tell, no historian has yet published considerations about the potential impact of Drusus Nero's death on the Emperor's decision - which he evidently must have made during the funeral week - to turn Herod the Great from "a friend" into "a subject". My September 2006 draft-reconstruction of 9 BC still has it's flaws, so I've done a bit of closer scrutiny on it this week. Part One deals with Syllaeus, Part Two deals with Drusus, and Part Three ties them together, concluding with thoughts on the important question at hand.
Seriously now, I'll leave it to some seasoned professional to tighten my arguments and strengthen my conclusion, if such can be done. Until then, these rough sketches of someone else's future (possibly groundbreaking) scholarship really need to be here, online. (Click the links or scroll down through today's previous posts.)
Happy New Year, Y'all. :)
Did Drusus' Death Hurt Herod in 9 BC? (3)
In the last post, I tentatively concluded that Drusus’ funeral in 9 BC fell between mid-August and November. Prior to that, I showed that Syllaeus’ arrival by sea must have fallen between late August and mid-October. Unfortunately, these overlapping ranges don’t tell us the actual event dates. However, other details from Josephus and Cassius Dio can help us build a reasonable sequence of these events.
Dio tells us Augustus did not officially end his campaign when he entered the city with the funeral procession. And later, Dio strongly implies that Augustus went back outside the city after the funeral, to remain in mourning until January. [For the reason, see post #2.] But Josephus strictly says that Augustus was at his palace at least once, to meet with Syllaeus and the envoys of Herod, regarding the invasion of Nabatea. According to Josephus, Caesar was aware of Syllaeus and allowed him at court.
Obviously, if Augustus was in Rome with Syllaeus, then so was Drusus’ coffin. It may have been some days before the funeral, or the Emperor might have stayed a few days after before leaving Rome again, but Syllaeus definitely saw an Augustus who was officially in mourning.
Evidently, then, Syllaeus arrived in Rome at least a couple of days before Drusus’ funeral. But Josephus also tells us that Syllaeus had time, while in Rome, to receive messengers from Nabatea telling him details of what happened in the invasion. This makes it more likely still that Syllaeus arrived some weeks before Drusus’ funeral. Without more specific data, we can still conclude that both events happened during the autumn, and Drusus’ funeral came last, closer to winter than to summer.
At least one more detail from Josephus deserves attention now. Syllaeus “changed into black dress” to express his own mourning over the Nabatean losses. Although Josephus did not tell us about the death of Drusus, we can now see there was probably an ulterior motive in this wearing of black. Syllaeus’ tears and his clothes both displayed an emotional sympathy for what Augustus was going through personally. This is the first aspect in which we might say the death of Drusus gave an advantage to Syllaeus in his accusations against Herod. There is one more.
In Syllaeus’ day at court, the friends of Herod were already there. (Having left somewhat later, this is yet additional confirmation that some time had passed since Syllaeus’ arrival.) After listening to the Nabatean’s long, emotional report, Augustus was so upset he only allowed those envoys one word – yes or no, was it true that Herod took an army into North Arabia? Of course, they said yes. But this last question may be important to ask:
If Drusus had not been dead, if Caesar had not just lost his best General (and the joint-heir with his grandsons), if Syllaeus had not been able to connect in personal commiseration with the Emperor, if it had been a normal season and Augustus was having a great year instead of a terrible one… would things have gone differently? Would Augustus have been more patient, if the bad report hadn’t come within days of a devastatingly tragic state funeral? Would the Emperor have inquired more if he had time? Or if he hadn’t been officially in mourning? Or, if Syllaeus hadn’t used the angle he did, would Augustus even have entertained an audience that was merely for a personal grievance, while the whole city and Caesar himself were in mourning?
Is it possible that one reason the Emperor limited his inquiries was out of respect to Drusus and to the moment? And if we consider that such lack of care for thoroughness was uncharacteristic of Augustus Caesar, how much more could this anomaly be explained by the Emperor’s emotions over Drusus, and by the formality of the occasion for official mourning? Or financially, if Augustus was already weighing his diminishing chances of securing Germany without Drusus, is it possible the Emperor suddenly changed his opinion about letting the 64 year old Herod continue to remain unsettled on the future rule of Israel, among his many sons? In other words, was the loss of Drusus a reason for Caesar to move up his timetable for annexing Judea? It’s possible.
The answer to all of these questions might possibly be yes. To say the least, the death of Drusus had a profound effect on Augustus’ life and his plans for the imperial succession. Dio Cassius essentially tells us the Emperor stayed outside the city all winter, in official mourning. That makes it all the more remarkable that Syllaeus and Herod’s envoys were even able to see Augustus at the palace, for the brief days or weeks that Caesar was actually in Rome.
The timeline says this might have happened in September, October or November, but it happened this way. Finally, then, to answer the question: Did the death of Drusus hurt Herod’s temporary and immediate fortunes as Augustus responded to Syllaeus in mourning? Of course we can only guess how much this turn of events helped cause Augustus to make Herod his "subject". But it's not a big leap to say that Drusus' death did hurt Herod's cause. At least, from all we can see, it sure didn’t help!
Dio tells us Augustus did not officially end his campaign when he entered the city with the funeral procession. And later, Dio strongly implies that Augustus went back outside the city after the funeral, to remain in mourning until January. [For the reason, see post #2.] But Josephus strictly says that Augustus was at his palace at least once, to meet with Syllaeus and the envoys of Herod, regarding the invasion of Nabatea. According to Josephus, Caesar was aware of Syllaeus and allowed him at court.
Obviously, if Augustus was in Rome with Syllaeus, then so was Drusus’ coffin. It may have been some days before the funeral, or the Emperor might have stayed a few days after before leaving Rome again, but Syllaeus definitely saw an Augustus who was officially in mourning.
Evidently, then, Syllaeus arrived in Rome at least a couple of days before Drusus’ funeral. But Josephus also tells us that Syllaeus had time, while in Rome, to receive messengers from Nabatea telling him details of what happened in the invasion. This makes it more likely still that Syllaeus arrived some weeks before Drusus’ funeral. Without more specific data, we can still conclude that both events happened during the autumn, and Drusus’ funeral came last, closer to winter than to summer.
At least one more detail from Josephus deserves attention now. Syllaeus “changed into black dress” to express his own mourning over the Nabatean losses. Although Josephus did not tell us about the death of Drusus, we can now see there was probably an ulterior motive in this wearing of black. Syllaeus’ tears and his clothes both displayed an emotional sympathy for what Augustus was going through personally. This is the first aspect in which we might say the death of Drusus gave an advantage to Syllaeus in his accusations against Herod. There is one more.
In Syllaeus’ day at court, the friends of Herod were already there. (Having left somewhat later, this is yet additional confirmation that some time had passed since Syllaeus’ arrival.) After listening to the Nabatean’s long, emotional report, Augustus was so upset he only allowed those envoys one word – yes or no, was it true that Herod took an army into North Arabia? Of course, they said yes. But this last question may be important to ask:
If Drusus had not been dead, if Caesar had not just lost his best General (and the joint-heir with his grandsons), if Syllaeus had not been able to connect in personal commiseration with the Emperor, if it had been a normal season and Augustus was having a great year instead of a terrible one… would things have gone differently? Would Augustus have been more patient, if the bad report hadn’t come within days of a devastatingly tragic state funeral? Would the Emperor have inquired more if he had time? Or if he hadn’t been officially in mourning? Or, if Syllaeus hadn’t used the angle he did, would Augustus even have entertained an audience that was merely for a personal grievance, while the whole city and Caesar himself were in mourning?
Is it possible that one reason the Emperor limited his inquiries was out of respect to Drusus and to the moment? And if we consider that such lack of care for thoroughness was uncharacteristic of Augustus Caesar, how much more could this anomaly be explained by the Emperor’s emotions over Drusus, and by the formality of the occasion for official mourning? Or financially, if Augustus was already weighing his diminishing chances of securing Germany without Drusus, is it possible the Emperor suddenly changed his opinion about letting the 64 year old Herod continue to remain unsettled on the future rule of Israel, among his many sons? In other words, was the loss of Drusus a reason for Caesar to move up his timetable for annexing Judea? It’s possible.
The answer to all of these questions might possibly be yes. To say the least, the death of Drusus had a profound effect on Augustus’ life and his plans for the imperial succession. Dio Cassius essentially tells us the Emperor stayed outside the city all winter, in official mourning. That makes it all the more remarkable that Syllaeus and Herod’s envoys were even able to see Augustus at the palace, for the brief days or weeks that Caesar was actually in Rome.
The timeline says this might have happened in September, October or November, but it happened this way. Finally, then, to answer the question: Did the death of Drusus hurt Herod’s temporary and immediate fortunes as Augustus responded to Syllaeus in mourning? Of course we can only guess how much this turn of events helped cause Augustus to make Herod his "subject". But it's not a big leap to say that Drusus' death did hurt Herod's cause. At least, from all we can see, it sure didn’t help!
Did Drusus' Death Hurt Herod in 9 BC? (2)
The fatal injury incurred by Claudius Drusus Nero happened after the General had already been campaigning for some time – midsummer will be a good first estimate to start working from. Whenever it was, precisely, Augustus was in North Italy “on campaign” and Tiberius was at Rome celebrating his Pannonian victory. Within the thirty days after Drusus’ injury, the news and Tiberius each had to travel a thousand miles, so the older Nero brother was able to see his wounded sibling before he died. These thirty days make our first estimate of the death date something close to August 1st, perhaps.
The funeral procession began in Germany, crossing the same thousand (or so) miles up the Rhine riverbank and over the Alps. Soldiers and townsmen carried the coffin while Tiberius led the way on foot. Since thirty miles a day is a generous estimate, the procession needed over a month to get Drusus’ body to Rome. This puts the starting point for this estimate in early to mid September. Funeral activities themselves are somewhat more difficult to measure in time. The body laid in state in the Forum, two orations were given, and the burial itself – perhaps a week, total? So if Drusus fell off his horse July 1st, he’d be buried by late September or thereabouts.
However, none of that is the point. The real question is – where was Augustus during all this time and when did he know for certain that Drusus was dead? If we can trust Tacitus (for now, despite the fact he seems to get the season wrong) Augustus waited in North Italy for the funeral cortege. None of the other evidence contradicts this, and it lines up well with Dio’s repeated comment that Augustus – apart from the funeral – avoided spending time inside Rome until January 1st. [The formal return from a campaign required celebratory rites that Augustus refused to perform under the circumstances.]
Again, if Drusus was injured midway through campaigning season, it looks like the Emperor remained away from Rome until about mid-September. Dio’s general account of the German campaign makes it impossible to calculate the date of Drusus’ injury with anything close to precision, but conquering “with difficulty” the lands of the Chatti, Suebi and Cherusci peoples, plus pillaging everything up to the Elbe River – that must have taken more than a couple of months, at least. Trusting the army absolutely didn’t start before March – we might guess the injury couldn’t happen before June 1st, suggesting a funeral no earlier than mid-August. Searching for the other extreme, we might take Suetonius’ statement that Drusus died at summer camp to put the death no later than mid-September, with a funeral as late as early November.
A final consideration may be the seemingly dismissable words of Tacitus, “In the bitterest of the winter”. Granting the sensationalism of the passage, and even that its import is of the popular grievance in 19 AD, not necessarily to be given as fact about 9 BC… Even so, we might still consider the word “winter”. That is, the summer camp may have been left up late since its commander had not yet returned. If Drusus’ body left Vetera (or Mogontiacum) as late as October 1st, it would be close to November when the cortege met Augustus at Ticinum – a reasonably practical sense for the start of “winter”, especially since Tacitus elsewhere says an early winter once fell in late September (14 AD).
At any rate, if Tacitus’ words fit the popular memory some 27 years later, this might at least suggest a funeral closer to the later end of our range than the earlier – a conclusion that also gives Drusus’ summer campaign more time to do all that Dio claims it accomplished. Finally, Dio himself says the funeral cortege passed the army’s winter quarters along its route. (Suetonius is the one who mentions Drusus’ summer camp.) Altogether, this range gives us a funeral sometime in Autumn, with a much better chance of it being closer to winter than summer.
In the third and final post of this series, I’ll compare the range of dates for Drusus’ funeral with those for Syllaeus’ arrival. A couple more details from Dio and Josephus may help us fix the funeral date a bit more precisely in order to help consider the question, “Did the death of Drusus affect Caesar’s response to Herod’s invasion of Nabatea?”
The funeral procession began in Germany, crossing the same thousand (or so) miles up the Rhine riverbank and over the Alps. Soldiers and townsmen carried the coffin while Tiberius led the way on foot. Since thirty miles a day is a generous estimate, the procession needed over a month to get Drusus’ body to Rome. This puts the starting point for this estimate in early to mid September. Funeral activities themselves are somewhat more difficult to measure in time. The body laid in state in the Forum, two orations were given, and the burial itself – perhaps a week, total? So if Drusus fell off his horse July 1st, he’d be buried by late September or thereabouts.
However, none of that is the point. The real question is – where was Augustus during all this time and when did he know for certain that Drusus was dead? If we can trust Tacitus (for now, despite the fact he seems to get the season wrong) Augustus waited in North Italy for the funeral cortege. None of the other evidence contradicts this, and it lines up well with Dio’s repeated comment that Augustus – apart from the funeral – avoided spending time inside Rome until January 1st. [The formal return from a campaign required celebratory rites that Augustus refused to perform under the circumstances.]
Again, if Drusus was injured midway through campaigning season, it looks like the Emperor remained away from Rome until about mid-September. Dio’s general account of the German campaign makes it impossible to calculate the date of Drusus’ injury with anything close to precision, but conquering “with difficulty” the lands of the Chatti, Suebi and Cherusci peoples, plus pillaging everything up to the Elbe River – that must have taken more than a couple of months, at least. Trusting the army absolutely didn’t start before March – we might guess the injury couldn’t happen before June 1st, suggesting a funeral no earlier than mid-August. Searching for the other extreme, we might take Suetonius’ statement that Drusus died at summer camp to put the death no later than mid-September, with a funeral as late as early November.
A final consideration may be the seemingly dismissable words of Tacitus, “In the bitterest of the winter”. Granting the sensationalism of the passage, and even that its import is of the popular grievance in 19 AD, not necessarily to be given as fact about 9 BC… Even so, we might still consider the word “winter”. That is, the summer camp may have been left up late since its commander had not yet returned. If Drusus’ body left Vetera (or Mogontiacum) as late as October 1st, it would be close to November when the cortege met Augustus at Ticinum – a reasonably practical sense for the start of “winter”, especially since Tacitus elsewhere says an early winter once fell in late September (14 AD).
At any rate, if Tacitus’ words fit the popular memory some 27 years later, this might at least suggest a funeral closer to the later end of our range than the earlier – a conclusion that also gives Drusus’ summer campaign more time to do all that Dio claims it accomplished. Finally, Dio himself says the funeral cortege passed the army’s winter quarters along its route. (Suetonius is the one who mentions Drusus’ summer camp.) Altogether, this range gives us a funeral sometime in Autumn, with a much better chance of it being closer to winter than summer.
In the third and final post of this series, I’ll compare the range of dates for Drusus’ funeral with those for Syllaeus’ arrival. A couple more details from Dio and Josephus may help us fix the funeral date a bit more precisely in order to help consider the question, “Did the death of Drusus affect Caesar’s response to Herod’s invasion of Nabatea?”
Did Drusus' Death Hurt Herod in 9 BC? (1)
***This is the first of three posts about the chronology involved with blending Josephus’ Antiquities 17:278-299 and Cassius’ Dio’s History 55:1.1-5.1. This story is what leads Augustus Caesar to declare Herod the Great as his “subject”, at which point I believe the Emperor also commissioned plans for the first Roman census of Herod’s Kingdom [that likely took place in 7 BC]. What follows here has no direct bearing on my census theory, but will simply consider the relative timing of Roman and Eastern events in regard to the question, “Did Drusus’ death in 9 BC have any effect on Augustus’ response to the Nabatean affair?”***
For Syllaeus the Nabatean to reach Rome before sailing closed for the year (not to mention for Herod’s emissaries to do so as well, a bit later on), that first meeting between Herod the Great and Governor Saturninus must have been in early July at the absolute latest. And for Syllaeus the Nabatean to find Augustus that Autumn in the palace at Rome, the corpse of Claudius Drusus Nero must have been back in Rome by mid to late October. These are rough estimates, but the windows for activity are fairly tight.
The logistics are as daunting as any situation I’ve studied, and the sources don’t drown us in chronological details. First the East: Herod has to meet with Saturninus, schedule both the Governor and Syllaeus for a summit at Beruit, wait thirty days after that summit, meet with Saturninus again, invade North Arabia, and return home to send envoys with enough time to reach Rome by sea. Even if we grant November 10th as the far outside limit for arrival, Syllaeus must have been on ship by early September, leaving August as his 30 day grace period and July for the first meeting, Herod's scheduling and everyone's travel to the summit. So when did Saturninus arrive in Syria?
The normal arrival time for a new Proconsul is about midsummer, which is why I’d previously assumed Herod must have asked the prior Governor (Marcus Titius) for help and been turned down. If the Great King was so eager in early July, three years into a frustrating rebellion, he probably felt the same way a month or more earlier. In my reconstruction of 9 BC, I wrote that this is precisely what must have happened, but now I see there is another option: Maybe Titius wasn’t around at all when Saturninus came.
Unfortunately, the record is silent on Marcus Titius’ actual departure date. If he left early or died in office, it would not only prevent Herod from seeking his help earlier that year, it could also have caused Saturninus to arrive early in the province, leaving more time to fit in the daunting logistics outlined above. However likely this conjecture may be, we might give it extra weight because it makes both sailing parties more likely to arrive at a reasonable time. Even against the August northwesterlies (Etesian Winds), ships from Caesarea can reach Rome in less than two months by sailing under cover (like Paul did in Acts 27).
In short, the absence of a Governor in early 9 BC would explain Herod’s eagerness to see Saturninus just as well as the replacement of an uncooperative Governor. Either way, Herod has to see Saturninus in May, June or July to make the rest work. Of course, the downside to this new range of options is that it leaves a much looser set of parameters for placing the visit of Syllaeus to Augustus at Rome. Sailing west during August makes a six week trip a bit longer, so if Syllaeus embarked between July 1st and September 1st, he’d reach Rome somewhere between late August and mid-October. Assuming Herod caught on quickly, the party he sent would have been close behind. This rough estimate may be the best we can do, but it might be good enough.
In my next post, I’ll address chronological details in Dio Cassius and look for evidence of any overlap in the timing of Drusus’ death & funeral and Syllaeus’ travel & audience before Caesar.
For Syllaeus the Nabatean to reach Rome before sailing closed for the year (not to mention for Herod’s emissaries to do so as well, a bit later on), that first meeting between Herod the Great and Governor Saturninus must have been in early July at the absolute latest. And for Syllaeus the Nabatean to find Augustus that Autumn in the palace at Rome, the corpse of Claudius Drusus Nero must have been back in Rome by mid to late October. These are rough estimates, but the windows for activity are fairly tight.
The logistics are as daunting as any situation I’ve studied, and the sources don’t drown us in chronological details. First the East: Herod has to meet with Saturninus, schedule both the Governor and Syllaeus for a summit at Beruit, wait thirty days after that summit, meet with Saturninus again, invade North Arabia, and return home to send envoys with enough time to reach Rome by sea. Even if we grant November 10th as the far outside limit for arrival, Syllaeus must have been on ship by early September, leaving August as his 30 day grace period and July for the first meeting, Herod's scheduling and everyone's travel to the summit. So when did Saturninus arrive in Syria?
The normal arrival time for a new Proconsul is about midsummer, which is why I’d previously assumed Herod must have asked the prior Governor (Marcus Titius) for help and been turned down. If the Great King was so eager in early July, three years into a frustrating rebellion, he probably felt the same way a month or more earlier. In my reconstruction of 9 BC, I wrote that this is precisely what must have happened, but now I see there is another option: Maybe Titius wasn’t around at all when Saturninus came.
Unfortunately, the record is silent on Marcus Titius’ actual departure date. If he left early or died in office, it would not only prevent Herod from seeking his help earlier that year, it could also have caused Saturninus to arrive early in the province, leaving more time to fit in the daunting logistics outlined above. However likely this conjecture may be, we might give it extra weight because it makes both sailing parties more likely to arrive at a reasonable time. Even against the August northwesterlies (Etesian Winds), ships from Caesarea can reach Rome in less than two months by sailing under cover (like Paul did in Acts 27).
In short, the absence of a Governor in early 9 BC would explain Herod’s eagerness to see Saturninus just as well as the replacement of an uncooperative Governor. Either way, Herod has to see Saturninus in May, June or July to make the rest work. Of course, the downside to this new range of options is that it leaves a much looser set of parameters for placing the visit of Syllaeus to Augustus at Rome. Sailing west during August makes a six week trip a bit longer, so if Syllaeus embarked between July 1st and September 1st, he’d reach Rome somewhere between late August and mid-October. Assuming Herod caught on quickly, the party he sent would have been close behind. This rough estimate may be the best we can do, but it might be good enough.
In my next post, I’ll address chronological details in Dio Cassius and look for evidence of any overlap in the timing of Drusus’ death & funeral and Syllaeus’ travel & audience before Caesar.
November 30, 2008
Abilene - Index & Update
In case you missed them, I posted three times about Abilene, a small region north of Galilee, beyond Mount Hermon (west of Damascus). Abilene was, for some years, the tetrarchy of a man named Lysanias. According to my research, it seems to have been annexed by Rome in 32 AD and split between Sidon and Damascus. I personally believe this event increased the anxiety of Herod Antipas, if ever so slightly, given the post-Sejanus political climate of 32 and 33 AD.
All three posts went up in November. Here are their links:
And now I have one update to include: In the first two posts, I'd left out any consideration of Abilene after 32 AD. In fact, Josephus tells us that in 37 AD, Caligula gave "the tetrarchy of Lysanias" to Herod Agrippa [along with the recently embattled Gaulanitis and the rest of the late Philip's tetrarchy; no doubt Caligula in early 37 was heavily influenced by his chief advisor Macro, by the way]. [Note: Contrary to a common misconception, Macro & Caligula did NOT give ANY territory to Aretas the Nabatean in 37.]
So Damascus remained autonomous in 37, under the Governor of Syria, but evidently it lost its recently granted territory in Abilene. Perhaps Governor Flaccus' settlement in 32 AD didn't achieve the desired effect, perhaps the Sidonians and the Damascenes quarreled even more with a common border, or perhaps Macro & Caligula had some other reason for giving the city and region around that key mountain pass to Agrippa instead. Whatever the case, the fact that Abilene went to Agrippa in 37 does not mean it stayed with Lysanias up to that point.
Therefore, as in earlier posts, I stand by the logic that Damascus and Sidon must have been disputing over the territory of Abilene, which means Lysanias was dead or gone by that time (but not before 28 AD). Also, as I said in earlier posts, if the Damascenes & Sidonians were somehow fighting over the very peak of Mount Hermon, then all this would be incorrect, but as much as that seems highly unlikely, I stand by my conclusions for now. :)
All three posts went up in November. Here are their links:
And now I have one update to include: In the first two posts, I'd left out any consideration of Abilene after 32 AD. In fact, Josephus tells us that in 37 AD, Caligula gave "the tetrarchy of Lysanias" to Herod Agrippa [along with the recently embattled Gaulanitis and the rest of the late Philip's tetrarchy; no doubt Caligula in early 37 was heavily influenced by his chief advisor Macro, by the way]. [Note: Contrary to a common misconception, Macro & Caligula did NOT give ANY territory to Aretas the Nabatean in 37.]
So Damascus remained autonomous in 37, under the Governor of Syria, but evidently it lost its recently granted territory in Abilene. Perhaps Governor Flaccus' settlement in 32 AD didn't achieve the desired effect, perhaps the Sidonians and the Damascenes quarreled even more with a common border, or perhaps Macro & Caligula had some other reason for giving the city and region around that key mountain pass to Agrippa instead. Whatever the case, the fact that Abilene went to Agrippa in 37 does not mean it stayed with Lysanias up to that point.
Therefore, as in earlier posts, I stand by the logic that Damascus and Sidon must have been disputing over the territory of Abilene, which means Lysanias was dead or gone by that time (but not before 28 AD). Also, as I said in earlier posts, if the Damascenes & Sidonians were somehow fighting over the very peak of Mount Hermon, then all this would be incorrect, but as much as that seems highly unlikely, I stand by my conclusions for now. :)
October 23, 2008
Gadara & Gerasa: Text & Geography
I discovered tonight that Zondervan's Archaeological Study Bible has a pretty good article (on page 1635 called "Gergesenes, Gerasenes or Gadarenes?") about the geography surrounding certain textual differences in Mark 5:1, Luke 8:26 & Matt 8:28. Yeah, it's an ancient manuscript thing... but the Geography is solid. So I'm thinking: "Why don't the translation committee's give way to that context and put "Gadarenes" (or maybe "Gergasenes"?) into the main text, leaving the more common but least likely "Gerasenes" for the footnotes?" Except that just shows you how out of touch I am with some scholars' mindset: The text is all there is!
Okay, maybe the word "Gerasenes" shows up in more manuscripts of Luke and Mark. But if you believe the account is factual (which I assume most translation committees do) then it seems silly to go with the word that's by far the least likely to be accurate IN FACT! From all I can tell, Biblical scholars agree on the geography, but it seems the translators go with the textual critics for their text and leave the practical scholarship for their footnotes. And all I'm saying is, why can't that be the other way around? (partial hat tip to jps on the footnote reversal idea) Oh, well. The rest of the Biblio-world can argue about translations. I'll just keep doing my Synopsis! :)
Oddly enough, classical scholarship once had it's own controversy over Gadara & Gerasa. Josephus said Aretas the Nabatean attacked Herod Antipas at "Gamala". Many scholars thought that didn't work, and suggested emending the text to "Ga"-something. Gadara & Gerasa were leading candidates until Glen Bowersock pointed out that Gamala was actually the most likely situation to have happened IN FACT... for reasons which previous scholars had apparently overlooked. That's almost a fairly similar situation. But, to be fair, I don't recall if there was much manuscript divergence on the Josephus text.
(Hat Tip to Michael Halcomb for nudging me into "Gerasene" waters tonight!)
Okay, maybe the word "Gerasenes" shows up in more manuscripts of Luke and Mark. But if you believe the account is factual (which I assume most translation committees do) then it seems silly to go with the word that's by far the least likely to be accurate IN FACT! From all I can tell, Biblical scholars agree on the geography, but it seems the translators go with the textual critics for their text and leave the practical scholarship for their footnotes. And all I'm saying is, why can't that be the other way around? (partial hat tip to jps on the footnote reversal idea) Oh, well. The rest of the Biblio-world can argue about translations. I'll just keep doing my Synopsis! :)
Oddly enough, classical scholarship once had it's own controversy over Gadara & Gerasa. Josephus said Aretas the Nabatean attacked Herod Antipas at "Gamala". Many scholars thought that didn't work, and suggested emending the text to "Ga"-something. Gadara & Gerasa were leading candidates until Glen Bowersock pointed out that Gamala was actually the most likely situation to have happened IN FACT... for reasons which previous scholars had apparently overlooked. That's almost a fairly similar situation. But, to be fair, I don't recall if there was much manuscript divergence on the Josephus text.
(Hat Tip to Michael Halcomb for nudging me into "Gerasene" waters tonight!)
July 05, 2008
Antipas and Sejanus
I've been going thru Tacitus & Dio backwards, looking for two things. One, I feel like I get a better view of developing trends with the benefit of hindsight. So the first 'thing' I'm looking for is just that - development in the situation. Ongoing 'plotlines' so to speak. The second thing I'm looking for is anything that could have affected Herod Antipas' level of confidence or apprehension about his own position. Here are my conclusions, so far:
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Generally, I'm finding there were lots of reasons for powerful people to fear Tiberius. Even knowing that Tacitus pumps up the negativity on such things, the overall train of events is fairly overwhelming. Under Augustus, most powerful people weren't stupid enough to cross him. But under Tiberius, the Emperor's entire attitude, actions and style gave every Roman person of status a serious reason to fear for their lives - though of course, at times, some had more cause to fear than did others.
Even an eastern 'client ruler' like Antipas had to take serious notice, especially when Tiberius took over Cappadocia and Commagene (17/18 AD) and continued raising Rome's influence over Armenia & Thrace (18/19 AD). Antipas knew the history of the region and could see the general trend was ongoing assimilation, usually leading to takeover. The general trend in Rome seemed to be that Tiberius could put men down for any excuse whatsoever, and the sources are in agreement that people of that day - with few exceptions - saw no consistent way to assess whose position would or would not remain secure. Away from Rome, apparently, it was the same.
This brings me to my first simple conclusion, purposely understated (for now). If everyone of status was cautious about Tiberius to some degree, then Herod Antipas was cautious about Tiberius to some degree. The only real room for debate here should be the question of whether we can tell, practically speaking, just how cautious Antipas was - or should have been. This issue will require some work, to say the least.
The next important question is this: was there a change in the 'caution level' displayed by Herod Antipas during the rise to power of Aelius Sejanus? This question, of course, is similar (perhaps related) to studies of Pontius Pilate in the past 60 years to the point - was there a change in Pilate's governing behavior over Israel after Sejanus' fall? (Scholars generally agree that there was, but differ as to the details of why.) Now, asking this same question of Antipas is similar in some ways, but free from the debate about accusations of antisemitism leveled at Pilate & Sejanus since 1948. (For more, see the wonderful Introduction to Helen Bond's work on Pilate.) Either way one judges Pilate on antisemitism, he does seem to be more cautious after Sejanus' fall. (This is based largely, but not totally, on his behavior during the trial of Jesus in 33 AD.)
So Pilate gets more cautious after October, 31 AD. In my personal opinion, so does Antipas.
Therefore, the next series of questions must review scrutiny about Antipas' alleged relationship with Sejanus. Harold Hoehner (who wrote Herod Antipas) credited the accusations by Agrippa, but Dieter Hennig (who wrote in German on Aelius Seianus) gave them extremely slight regard. Of course, Hennig gave the complex system of allegations extremely slight attention, as well. So I'm inclined to feel that much more study should be done. (I can't read German, but I can read his index and scan the page, which shows that Antipas gets barely one whole paragraph in Hennig's entire book! A friend translated that paragraph for me, and I'm hoping to get a professional rendering soon. But without knowing German, I'll have to forgo saying much more on Hennig. Any help here, from folks "out there" would be hugely appreciated.)
The issues surrounding Agrippa's accusations (against Antipas, regarding Sejanus, reported to Caligula, in 39 AD, for personal gain, all of which is told by Josephus) are indeed complicated. They may defy mastery, but they shouldn't be dismissed out of hand. The fact that Antipas couldn't deny one part of it suggests that it may not have been all false, at least. For now, my only strong suggestion on this important topic is that it absolutely deserves much more attention by serious scholars - hopefully those much more qualified than myself to make valid assessments on the matter. But I'll definitely continue trying to spark their interest with my personal ideas! ;)
Because I'm just blogging here (and because of the obvious difficulties just mentioned), I'm going to also forgo further discussion of Agrippa's accusations (for now) and just introduce my own big thought on the larger issue at hand. I'm not even going to try and make this next statement well-refined, either. This is my gut.
Herod Antipas had to have some kind of alliance or personal agreement with Sejanus at least by 27/28 AD, because otherwise he never would have made such a boneheaded move as to break his marriage alliance with Nabatea at the risk of creating an instability which could infuriate Tiberius - and all merely for a newer or a younger wife!
No way. Instead, Antipas had to believe he was safe from whatever vindictive entreaties King Aretas would surely have sent to Rome on behalf of his poor rejected daughter. Why else could Antipas possibly decide this was a good, wise or safe move unless he believed Sejanus would protect him from Tiberius and put off any complaints from Aretas?
That is my basic hypothesis. There are yet more considerations.
What were the specific benefits or political advantages for Antipas in his decision to marry Herodias? It wasn't just so John the Baptist could have something else to yell about! It wasn't only (though I personally believe it was partly) so that God Almighty could manipulate Herod into getting John off the stage. And most of all, it can't possibly have been pure lust. That's the most ignorant idea of all. Antipas surely would not have switched marriages simply for physical passion, unless she held some special power to excite an old tetrarch, just pushing 50 in those years (which is conceivable, but unlikely). Herod wasn't that stupid, and as even the worst chauvinist would probably say, nobody's that good in bed, to throw away your whole kingdom. So the lust argument doesn't add up. Rather, since Herod Antipas' first marriage had been for political advantage, we should expect his second marriage to include the same consideration. To say the least, marriage to Herodias must have held some greater promise for the aging Antipas than a merely physical entanglement.
Far more likely, the motivation to wed Herodias must have been motivated at least partly because of Herodias' strong family connection to Antonia [through her mother, Bereniece]. Of Roman women at the time, none were more well connected at the very highest levels, and it could be argued no man either, including Sejanus, had a more secure position than Antonia's, given that Antonia was Augustus' niece, Tiberius' sister-in-law and mother of the widely beloved, departed Germanicus. Her grandsons were still greatly favored by the people of Rome, and even if their mother Agrippina ('the elder') was in jeopardy, Antonia herself remained above reproach regarding her daughter-in-law's various personal offenses.
Now, it's a bit odd to think someone in 27/28 AD could ally themselves with both Sejanus AND Antonia, especially as many already suspected that Tiberius' prefect was plotting to kill the royal matron's grandsons [Caligula's older brothers, who lasted until 30 and 33]. But despite the unlikelihood that anyone in Rome could forge both alliances, Antipas was based overseas! And the method of arranging one alliance by marriage and the other by the promise of mutual benefit was a uniquely crafty strategy, especially if the alliance with Sejanus was kept a secret (as Agrippa's revelation suggests that it was).
There is plenty of evidence to suggest Antipas was just cagey enough to pull this off.
The rest of Herod Antipas' political record is spotlessly impressive, and his 42 year rule holds no consequential mistakes. (None, that is, other than alienating his brother-in-law/nephew Agrippa in 32 AD. In fact, asking Caligula for the title of "King" is not what brought Antipas down - it was the letter from Agrippa that just happened to show up when Antipas was there with the Emperor.) Antipas' fatal error only came by underestimating a mooching, down-on-his-luck nephew, who was probably fighting depression and seeming very unimpressive - and this error took seven years to bear its bad fruit. There are no other mistakes in Antipas' entire career that came at any significant cost. To the point, Herod Antipas was very good at what he did, ruling longer even than his Great father. He would never have divorced the Nabatean without some insurance.
There is much more to say to extend Antipas' great credit as a governor. The tetrarch's major decisions and actions known to us through history show us a man who knew how to play the game of maintaining stability AND staying on the Emperor's good side. Two strong examples of cultivated stability are Antipas' constructions at Sepphoris and Tiberias, which were built as cosmopolitan enlargements to appease, keep occupied and make proud his own landed gentry - not merely for Antipas' pride or imperial flattery. Antipas knew unhappy upper class citizens were the downfall of his brother Archelaus and that happy, busy ones produced a good, steady tax flow and earned positive favor from Rome. In terms of Imperial favor, Antipas' later efforts to earn Tiberius' praise (in 36 AD) were set to pay dividends at the minor cost of losing Vitellius' good will - and that cost was only delay, until Tiberius suddenly died. [The Syrian Governor was dallying at Jerusalem just before Pentecost - not Passover - when word came of Tiberius' death, releiving Vitellius of his duty to attack Nabatea for Antipas, as ordered by Tiberius.] In perfect fact, Antipas would still have gotten his way perfectly, if slowly, if Tiberius had only lived a bit longer. So the point remains. Antipas knew how to manipulate things well enough at the highest levels to help ensure his own position.
In fact, the very beginnings of Herod Antipas' career - in the year's worth of events surrounding his father's death (5/4 BC) - required subtle and deft manipulation of tenuous and constantly changing dynamics. That Antipas in time proved to be vastly more successful than his brother Archelaus is not only foreseeable by Herod the Great's initial decision (6/5 BC) to give Antipas all Israel, but the talents and strategies Anitpas would use to effect his 42 years of success were already on display in the interplay of events between Jericho and Caesar's final audience in October of 4 BC. The fact that Antipas played his cards not only well but masterfully, and to maximum possible effect, is clearly evident if one but looks carefully.
In all these ways, Antipas proved himself again and again to be a wise, capable ruler, totally in control during all stages of his career. Barring that final surprise by the constantly unsatisfied Agrippa (whose rise to status was of such complex circumstances as to be unforseable), Antipas literally never made a single wrong move, spanning five decades of considerable change, both in Rome and the east. That no other ruler west of Parthia save Tiberius himself accomplished even nearly such a feat is incredibly impressive.
To even consider that such a man made one huge mistake by thinking with his groin - this not only defies all reasonable expectations, it may also betray a lack of focus on the situation. True, many writers assume Antipas and Sejanus were allied, but serious scholarly justification has yet to be produced, since Hoehner. And given Hennig's near dismissal of the relationship, further treatment seems to be very necessary. As far as I can tell, it has not been done. But if any reader has access to articles or other works I've somehow overlooked, please let me know.
It should also be noted that the argument attempted here, which advances beyond the conclusions of Hoehner's essential volume, is based primarily on the assumption that Antipas' first marriage was in fact an alliance with Nabatea, but this should be undeniable. How often does the ruler of a country marry the neighboring king's daughter and NOT forge a treaty from such an alliance, unless the action sparks a war instead?
My whole contention, then, is that there is no other reasonable way to explain Antipas' divorce of his longtime Arabian bride UNLESS the tetrarch has assurances from Sejanus that King Aretas would have no success in prosecuting the divorce and breach of treaty in Rome. Whether or not Aretas DID make such attempts [which of course, we have no record of] or MIGHT have made such attempts is not actually within the question. The only pertinent fact is that Aretas COULD have made such attempts, and so Antipas would have known to be prepared for that eventuality - especially during the political turmoil of those years, when Tiberius absolutely COULD have been expected to use any complaint as a pretext for claiming all of Galilee. We've already seen that the times were extremely dangerous for Roman nobles and foreign client rulers, equally. Without a deal before his divorce, Herod Antipas would have risked everything against the very large probability that Tiberius - sooner or later - WOULD take it from him.
Simply put, Herod Antipas was not such a man to take such a risk. Therefore, he must have felt there was no risk. Naturally, the only reliable barrier to any complaints from Aretas would have been Sejanus.
That is why Antipas simply must have made a deal with Sejanus.
The question of what Sejanus expected to get out of that deal is another issue for further study, but it may have something to do with (1) the military situation in the East [Tiberius was already keeping Lamia from the Syrian Legions and would not have allowed Sejanus anywhere near the Egyptian ones], (2) the proximity of Galilee to Rome's breadbasket (Egypt) and (3) the enormous cache of armor and weaponry Agrippa cited. So this armor - which Antipas did not deny the existence of, which Agrippa had the greatest opportunity to observe during his 'mooching' years from 29 to 32 AD, and which no one of Antipas' meager resources could have assembled (secretly) in any short period of time - may be precisely what Sejanus expected to receive from Antipas.
Of course, this final question must rest until a fuller treatment may be given. In fact, it may not be possible to conclude what, if anything, Sejanus would have expected from Antipas. It's even possible Sejanus would make such an alliance merely for unspecified favors to be named at some future time. But the armor creation as one step toward a military contingency plan is not entirely implausible, showing at least one reason why that the whole alliance is far from implausible from Sejanus' perspective.
Again, we may never know entirely all the reasons WHY Sejanus or Antipas made their alliance, but for all the reasons discussed here above, they simply must have done so.
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Now, hopefully, someone more qualified than Bill Heroman will eventually level their scholarly efforts towards examining these claims and considerations with more academic rigor. But this is my contribution.
In the meantime, I will of course continue striving to improve my own efforts...
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Generally, I'm finding there were lots of reasons for powerful people to fear Tiberius. Even knowing that Tacitus pumps up the negativity on such things, the overall train of events is fairly overwhelming. Under Augustus, most powerful people weren't stupid enough to cross him. But under Tiberius, the Emperor's entire attitude, actions and style gave every Roman person of status a serious reason to fear for their lives - though of course, at times, some had more cause to fear than did others.
Even an eastern 'client ruler' like Antipas had to take serious notice, especially when Tiberius took over Cappadocia and Commagene (17/18 AD) and continued raising Rome's influence over Armenia & Thrace (18/19 AD). Antipas knew the history of the region and could see the general trend was ongoing assimilation, usually leading to takeover. The general trend in Rome seemed to be that Tiberius could put men down for any excuse whatsoever, and the sources are in agreement that people of that day - with few exceptions - saw no consistent way to assess whose position would or would not remain secure. Away from Rome, apparently, it was the same.
This brings me to my first simple conclusion, purposely understated (for now). If everyone of status was cautious about Tiberius to some degree, then Herod Antipas was cautious about Tiberius to some degree. The only real room for debate here should be the question of whether we can tell, practically speaking, just how cautious Antipas was - or should have been. This issue will require some work, to say the least.
The next important question is this: was there a change in the 'caution level' displayed by Herod Antipas during the rise to power of Aelius Sejanus? This question, of course, is similar (perhaps related) to studies of Pontius Pilate in the past 60 years to the point - was there a change in Pilate's governing behavior over Israel after Sejanus' fall? (Scholars generally agree that there was, but differ as to the details of why.) Now, asking this same question of Antipas is similar in some ways, but free from the debate about accusations of antisemitism leveled at Pilate & Sejanus since 1948. (For more, see the wonderful Introduction to Helen Bond's work on Pilate.) Either way one judges Pilate on antisemitism, he does seem to be more cautious after Sejanus' fall. (This is based largely, but not totally, on his behavior during the trial of Jesus in 33 AD.)
So Pilate gets more cautious after October, 31 AD. In my personal opinion, so does Antipas.
Therefore, the next series of questions must review scrutiny about Antipas' alleged relationship with Sejanus. Harold Hoehner (who wrote Herod Antipas) credited the accusations by Agrippa, but Dieter Hennig (who wrote in German on Aelius Seianus) gave them extremely slight regard. Of course, Hennig gave the complex system of allegations extremely slight attention, as well. So I'm inclined to feel that much more study should be done. (I can't read German, but I can read his index and scan the page, which shows that Antipas gets barely one whole paragraph in Hennig's entire book! A friend translated that paragraph for me, and I'm hoping to get a professional rendering soon. But without knowing German, I'll have to forgo saying much more on Hennig. Any help here, from folks "out there" would be hugely appreciated.)
The issues surrounding Agrippa's accusations (against Antipas, regarding Sejanus, reported to Caligula, in 39 AD, for personal gain, all of which is told by Josephus) are indeed complicated. They may defy mastery, but they shouldn't be dismissed out of hand. The fact that Antipas couldn't deny one part of it suggests that it may not have been all false, at least. For now, my only strong suggestion on this important topic is that it absolutely deserves much more attention by serious scholars - hopefully those much more qualified than myself to make valid assessments on the matter. But I'll definitely continue trying to spark their interest with my personal ideas! ;)
Because I'm just blogging here (and because of the obvious difficulties just mentioned), I'm going to also forgo further discussion of Agrippa's accusations (for now) and just introduce my own big thought on the larger issue at hand. I'm not even going to try and make this next statement well-refined, either. This is my gut.
Herod Antipas had to have some kind of alliance or personal agreement with Sejanus at least by 27/28 AD, because otherwise he never would have made such a boneheaded move as to break his marriage alliance with Nabatea at the risk of creating an instability which could infuriate Tiberius - and all merely for a newer or a younger wife!
No way. Instead, Antipas had to believe he was safe from whatever vindictive entreaties King Aretas would surely have sent to Rome on behalf of his poor rejected daughter. Why else could Antipas possibly decide this was a good, wise or safe move unless he believed Sejanus would protect him from Tiberius and put off any complaints from Aretas?
That is my basic hypothesis. There are yet more considerations.
What were the specific benefits or political advantages for Antipas in his decision to marry Herodias? It wasn't just so John the Baptist could have something else to yell about! It wasn't only (though I personally believe it was partly) so that God Almighty could manipulate Herod into getting John off the stage. And most of all, it can't possibly have been pure lust. That's the most ignorant idea of all. Antipas surely would not have switched marriages simply for physical passion, unless she held some special power to excite an old tetrarch, just pushing 50 in those years (which is conceivable, but unlikely). Herod wasn't that stupid, and as even the worst chauvinist would probably say, nobody's that good in bed, to throw away your whole kingdom. So the lust argument doesn't add up. Rather, since Herod Antipas' first marriage had been for political advantage, we should expect his second marriage to include the same consideration. To say the least, marriage to Herodias must have held some greater promise for the aging Antipas than a merely physical entanglement.
Far more likely, the motivation to wed Herodias must have been motivated at least partly because of Herodias' strong family connection to Antonia [through her mother, Bereniece]. Of Roman women at the time, none were more well connected at the very highest levels, and it could be argued no man either, including Sejanus, had a more secure position than Antonia's, given that Antonia was Augustus' niece, Tiberius' sister-in-law and mother of the widely beloved, departed Germanicus. Her grandsons were still greatly favored by the people of Rome, and even if their mother Agrippina ('the elder') was in jeopardy, Antonia herself remained above reproach regarding her daughter-in-law's various personal offenses.
Now, it's a bit odd to think someone in 27/28 AD could ally themselves with both Sejanus AND Antonia, especially as many already suspected that Tiberius' prefect was plotting to kill the royal matron's grandsons [Caligula's older brothers, who lasted until 30 and 33]. But despite the unlikelihood that anyone in Rome could forge both alliances, Antipas was based overseas! And the method of arranging one alliance by marriage and the other by the promise of mutual benefit was a uniquely crafty strategy, especially if the alliance with Sejanus was kept a secret (as Agrippa's revelation suggests that it was).
There is plenty of evidence to suggest Antipas was just cagey enough to pull this off.
The rest of Herod Antipas' political record is spotlessly impressive, and his 42 year rule holds no consequential mistakes. (None, that is, other than alienating his brother-in-law/nephew Agrippa in 32 AD. In fact, asking Caligula for the title of "King" is not what brought Antipas down - it was the letter from Agrippa that just happened to show up when Antipas was there with the Emperor.) Antipas' fatal error only came by underestimating a mooching, down-on-his-luck nephew, who was probably fighting depression and seeming very unimpressive - and this error took seven years to bear its bad fruit. There are no other mistakes in Antipas' entire career that came at any significant cost. To the point, Herod Antipas was very good at what he did, ruling longer even than his Great father. He would never have divorced the Nabatean without some insurance.
There is much more to say to extend Antipas' great credit as a governor. The tetrarch's major decisions and actions known to us through history show us a man who knew how to play the game of maintaining stability AND staying on the Emperor's good side. Two strong examples of cultivated stability are Antipas' constructions at Sepphoris and Tiberias, which were built as cosmopolitan enlargements to appease, keep occupied and make proud his own landed gentry - not merely for Antipas' pride or imperial flattery. Antipas knew unhappy upper class citizens were the downfall of his brother Archelaus and that happy, busy ones produced a good, steady tax flow and earned positive favor from Rome. In terms of Imperial favor, Antipas' later efforts to earn Tiberius' praise (in 36 AD) were set to pay dividends at the minor cost of losing Vitellius' good will - and that cost was only delay, until Tiberius suddenly died. [The Syrian Governor was dallying at Jerusalem just before Pentecost - not Passover - when word came of Tiberius' death, releiving Vitellius of his duty to attack Nabatea for Antipas, as ordered by Tiberius.] In perfect fact, Antipas would still have gotten his way perfectly, if slowly, if Tiberius had only lived a bit longer. So the point remains. Antipas knew how to manipulate things well enough at the highest levels to help ensure his own position.
In fact, the very beginnings of Herod Antipas' career - in the year's worth of events surrounding his father's death (5/4 BC) - required subtle and deft manipulation of tenuous and constantly changing dynamics. That Antipas in time proved to be vastly more successful than his brother Archelaus is not only foreseeable by Herod the Great's initial decision (6/5 BC) to give Antipas all Israel, but the talents and strategies Anitpas would use to effect his 42 years of success were already on display in the interplay of events between Jericho and Caesar's final audience in October of 4 BC. The fact that Antipas played his cards not only well but masterfully, and to maximum possible effect, is clearly evident if one but looks carefully.
In all these ways, Antipas proved himself again and again to be a wise, capable ruler, totally in control during all stages of his career. Barring that final surprise by the constantly unsatisfied Agrippa (whose rise to status was of such complex circumstances as to be unforseable), Antipas literally never made a single wrong move, spanning five decades of considerable change, both in Rome and the east. That no other ruler west of Parthia save Tiberius himself accomplished even nearly such a feat is incredibly impressive.
To even consider that such a man made one huge mistake by thinking with his groin - this not only defies all reasonable expectations, it may also betray a lack of focus on the situation. True, many writers assume Antipas and Sejanus were allied, but serious scholarly justification has yet to be produced, since Hoehner. And given Hennig's near dismissal of the relationship, further treatment seems to be very necessary. As far as I can tell, it has not been done. But if any reader has access to articles or other works I've somehow overlooked, please let me know.
It should also be noted that the argument attempted here, which advances beyond the conclusions of Hoehner's essential volume, is based primarily on the assumption that Antipas' first marriage was in fact an alliance with Nabatea, but this should be undeniable. How often does the ruler of a country marry the neighboring king's daughter and NOT forge a treaty from such an alliance, unless the action sparks a war instead?
My whole contention, then, is that there is no other reasonable way to explain Antipas' divorce of his longtime Arabian bride UNLESS the tetrarch has assurances from Sejanus that King Aretas would have no success in prosecuting the divorce and breach of treaty in Rome. Whether or not Aretas DID make such attempts [which of course, we have no record of] or MIGHT have made such attempts is not actually within the question. The only pertinent fact is that Aretas COULD have made such attempts, and so Antipas would have known to be prepared for that eventuality - especially during the political turmoil of those years, when Tiberius absolutely COULD have been expected to use any complaint as a pretext for claiming all of Galilee. We've already seen that the times were extremely dangerous for Roman nobles and foreign client rulers, equally. Without a deal before his divorce, Herod Antipas would have risked everything against the very large probability that Tiberius - sooner or later - WOULD take it from him.
Simply put, Herod Antipas was not such a man to take such a risk. Therefore, he must have felt there was no risk. Naturally, the only reliable barrier to any complaints from Aretas would have been Sejanus.
That is why Antipas simply must have made a deal with Sejanus.
The question of what Sejanus expected to get out of that deal is another issue for further study, but it may have something to do with (1) the military situation in the East [Tiberius was already keeping Lamia from the Syrian Legions and would not have allowed Sejanus anywhere near the Egyptian ones], (2) the proximity of Galilee to Rome's breadbasket (Egypt) and (3) the enormous cache of armor and weaponry Agrippa cited. So this armor - which Antipas did not deny the existence of, which Agrippa had the greatest opportunity to observe during his 'mooching' years from 29 to 32 AD, and which no one of Antipas' meager resources could have assembled (secretly) in any short period of time - may be precisely what Sejanus expected to receive from Antipas.
Of course, this final question must rest until a fuller treatment may be given. In fact, it may not be possible to conclude what, if anything, Sejanus would have expected from Antipas. It's even possible Sejanus would make such an alliance merely for unspecified favors to be named at some future time. But the armor creation as one step toward a military contingency plan is not entirely implausible, showing at least one reason why that the whole alliance is far from implausible from Sejanus' perspective.
Again, we may never know entirely all the reasons WHY Sejanus or Antipas made their alliance, but for all the reasons discussed here above, they simply must have done so.
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Now, hopefully, someone more qualified than Bill Heroman will eventually level their scholarly efforts towards examining these claims and considerations with more academic rigor. But this is my contribution.
In the meantime, I will of course continue striving to improve my own efforts...
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